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PRELIMINARY
Abstract
We estimate a two-sector DSGEmodel with financial intermediaries—a-la Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)—and quantify the importance of financial shocks
in accounting for aggregate and sectoral fluctuations. Our results indicate a significant
role of financial market news as a predictive force behind fluctuations. Specifically, news
about the valuation of assets held by financial intermediaries, reflected one to two years in
advance in corporate bond markets, affect the supply of credit and are estimated to be a sig-
nificant source of aggregate fluctuations, accounting for approximately 25% of output, 20%
of investment and 25% of hours variation in both cyclical and lower frequencies. Financial
intermediation is essential for the importance and propagation of these valuation shocks.
Importantly, valuation news shocks generate both aggregate and sectoral co-movement as
in the data.
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1 Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial crisis has highlighted the powerful role and importance of the finan-
cial sector. Valuation corrections in an apparently “small” pocket of the housing market, i.e.
the market for sub-prime mortgage loans escalated into a deep recession of disproportionate
magnitude, dubbed by many observers as the “Great Recession”. Disruptions in financial mar-
kets at the onset and during the 2007-2008 crisis were first reflected in movements of financial
market indicators, e.g. credit spreads on various private sector assets. These movements pre-
ceded significant declines in measures of real economic activity during the “Great Recession”.
Real GDP per capita fell by 4.7%, private per capita domestic investment by 32%, and total
non-farm business per capita hours by 9.7%.
In addition to the broad aggregate declines during the recession, there have been severe
sectoral downturns, especially in hours worked. Figure 1 shows the behavior of hours worked
across two broad sectors of the economy, namely, consumption and investment sectors (to be
precisely defined later). There are several interesting observations. First, sectoral hours tend
to move together over the cycle. Second, the extent of the recent downturn has been very
uneven, with investment sector hours (e.g. in industries such as construction, manufacturing,
utilities) experiencing a severe decline, while consumption sector hours (e.g. in industries such
as services, retail trade, finance) have been affected relatively less. Moreover, this pattern is
not specific to the 2008 recession and can be observed in previous cyclical episodes. Hours
worked in investment sector industries are relatively more cyclical compared to hours worked
in the consumption sector and they decline significantly more in recessions (see Figure 1 left
panel and Table 1) thereby acting as a powerful drag on total hours worked in these periods
of depressed activity. In fact, total hours are strongly correlated with investment sector hours
and only weakly so with consumption sector hours, suggesting the importance of the former
for the behavior of the total. These simple facts serve to demonstrate the importance of looking
beyond broad macroeconomic aggregates when studying the business cycle but also beg the
question whether and to what extent financial factors, as those experienced during the “Great
Recession” can explain (a) patterns of sectoral comovement and (b) sectoral differences sug-
gested by Figure 1. Our paper sets out to produce answers to these questions by adopting a
multi sector approach.
The recent financial crisis and the ensuing recession highlighted the link between finan-
cial markets and economic activity. There is a growing literature that establishes the predic-
tive power of financial market indicators for real macroeconomic aggregates (see for exam-
ple Gilchrist et al. (2009), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011), Mueller (2009), Kurmann and Otrok
(2010), Gomes and Schmid (2009) among others). An appealing interpretation is that these in-
dicators may incorporate advance information or news about future developments in the econ-
omy. Gilchrist et al. (2009) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011) identify credit market factors
from corporate bond spreads that predict future movements in output, employment or indus-
trial production. Philippon (2009) shows corporate bond market spreads to better anticipate—
compared to the stock market—future economic activity. Kurmann and Otrok (2010) suggest
the slope of the yield curve contains information about future total factor productivity (TFP).1
1In a similar vain, Beaudry and Portier (2006) suggest that movements in the stock market convey information
about the advent and eventual diffusion of new technologies that precede movements in total factor productivity
(TFP) and identify these movements as driven by TFP news. They provide evidence of their importance as drivers
of business cycles as agents act on revised expectations long before the actual realization of new technologies.
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In this paper we quantitatively explore the link between financial markets and the real
economy using a model with financial frictions which emphasizes the supply side of credit.
A distinctive aspect of our work is the dis-aggregation of production into two sectors, namely
consumption and investment sectors. The investment sector produces durable investment goods
that are converted into capital and are used as an input by both sectors. The consumption sector
produces non-durable consumption and services that provide direct utility for households. Both
sectors rely on financing capital acquisitions from intermediaries and adverse developments
(real or financial in origin) in the downstream consumption sector spill over to the upstream
investment sector through changes in demand for capital goods. This framework allows for a
quantitative investigation of real, nominal and financial sources as drivers for aggregate and
sectoral US fluctuations. We introduce financial intermediation as in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Inspired by the recent financial crisis the financial frictions
developed therein emphasize leverage constraints that effectively tie credit flows from the fi-
nancial sector to the real economy to the equity capital of intermediaries. Recently, DSGE
studies have considered financial factors in business cycle models (see Christiano et al. (2010),
Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Christensen and Dib (2008), Jermann and Qudrini (2012) among
others). The majority of these studies rely on the framework proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999)
in order to introduce financial frictions. However, in that approach, financial intermediation is a
veil—what matters is the borrower’s balance sheet condition. A very limited number of studies
consider financial frictions that constrain the lending behavior of financial intermediaries (see
for example, Gerali et al. (2010), Hirakata et al. (2011) and Villa (2010)).
We estimate the model on U.S. real, nominal and financial data over the period, 1990Q2
to 2011Q1. We include the 2008-2009 recession in our analysis in order to get a first look
at its drivers, an important consideration given our focus on factors that affect the supply of
credit. Besides a host of real and nominal shocks included in the model we also consider two
types of financial shocks. First, shocks that affect the value of the portfolio of assets held by
intermediaries (valuation shocks) and second, shocks that capture exogenous movements in
the intermediaries’ equity capital (equity capital shocks). We assume the former can incorpo-
rate information (or signals) about future valuations (valuation news) in addition to standard
unanticipated components. In the estimation, we construct and include separate corporate bond
spreads that match the definition of sectors we use. The corporate bond spreads help to identify
financial news shocks as they are likely to contain advance information in addition to what can
be extracted from real macroeconomic aggregates. This information is especially relevant in a
framework like ours that takes anticipation effects into account, as agents have a larger infor-
mation set compared to a more standard model which only contains unanticipated shocks.2 In
addition to corporate bond spreads we also include the equity capital of intermediaries as an ob-
servable in estimation. Given our focus on the behavior of financial intermediaries and the role
of equity capital in determining the demand for assets, we believe it is important to inform the
estimation with a variable that determines the degree of leverage of financial intermediaries.3
Our results are as follows.
2Including corporate bond spreads in our set of observables confers a main advantage: in contrast to other
financial variables, like stock prices for example, information from bond market prices is shown to be closely
related to various macroeconomic aggregates. For example, Gilchrist et al. (2009), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011)
underline the high predictive content of corporate bond market spreads for economic activity.
3Despite the intuitive links between financial markets and real aggregates, only a handful of papers include fi-
nancial market variables when estimating DSGE models with news shocks (Christiano et al. (2010), Davis (2007),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010)).
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• Valuation shocks can explain a sizable fraction of fluctuations at both business cycle and
lower frequencies. They can account for approximately 25% of output growth, 20% of
aggregate investment growth and 25% of aggregate hours variance. Interestingly, news
about asset valuations (coined “valuation news”) that arrive up to 2 years in advance
explain the majority of the variance shares above. Shocks of this type have been exam-
ined qualitatively in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and our paper provides, to the best of our
knowledge, the first quantitative estimate of their importance. Our estimates moreover
indicate that corporate bond market spreads contain substantial information about val-
uation news shocks. We find the quantitative importance of valuation news—in terms
of accounting for the variance shares of real macro variables—doubles when corporate
bond spreads are included in the estimation than if they are not. Consequently, the news
components of valuation disturbances account for a significant fraction of the variation
in corporate bond spreads. Interestingly, comparisons of the estimated valuation news
shocks series with a market indicator of default risk provided by Fitch (future probability
of default) suggests they can be plausibly interpreted as a stand-in of varying corporate
default risk.
• Valuation news shocks can generate aggregate and sectoral co-movement, a pervasive
stylized fact of business cycles and can explain the behavior of total hours worked sur-
prisingly well during recessions. The success in explaining the behavior of total hours
during recessions is linked to the fact these shocks almost entirely capture the declines
in investment sector hours during these periods, in line with the evidence presented in
Figure 1.
• Investment sector TFP shocks (or investment specific shocks popularized by Greenwood et al.
(2000) and Fisher (2006)) account for a relatively significant fraction of business cycle
variation in output growth, total investment growth and total hours worked consistent
with the findings in Fisher (2006). This stands in sharp contrast with their negligi-
ble importance reported in several recent estimated one sector DSGE models such as
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) or Gilchrist et al. (2009). The primary reason for this
finding is the tight link imposed in estimation—between investment specific shocks and
the relative price of investment. As a result, in those studies, investment specific shocks
are identified from the relative price of investment alone. This constraint does not neces-
sarily hold in a two sector model, except under special assumptions.
• From a historical perspective, valuation news shocks can entirely explain the decline
in GDP and a large fraction of the investment collapse in the early stages of the 2008
recession. They are also found to be driving, to a significant extent, the declines in GDP
and investment in the 2001 recession following the 1990s investment boom. However
they are estimated to have played a very limited role during the recession at the beginning
of the 1990s consistent with earlier work that found only limited credit supply effects on
the severity of the 1990-1991 recession (e.g. Bernanke et al. (1991)).
In addition to providing a quantitative estimate of financial shocks, this paper contributes
to the ongoing debate on the importance of news shocks for aggregate fluctuation. Despite the
fact, as demonstrated by Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), that it
is theoretically possible to generate a broad based expansion with an anticipated shock that
signals an improvement in total factor productivity (TFP), it has proven difficult to empirically
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estimate this expansionary effect in the data, or when such effect is present, it has at best a very
limited contribution to explaining aggregate fluctuations. For example, Barsky and Sims (2011)
show that good news about TFP in the future generates a recession today due to wealth effects
that depress hours and investment in favor of consumption and leisure. Similarly, in estimated
DSGE models, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) find that news about wage mark-up, prefer-
ence, government spending shocks dominate TFP news which only have a minor impact on
fluctuations. Broadly similar conclusions about the limited importance of news components in
technology related disturbances are reached by Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) and Fujiwara et al.
(2011) in estimated New Keynesian DSGE models. But at the same time this earlier work
points to “other”, but yet to be precisely specified, sources of news as important drivers of ag-
gregate fluctuations. Where exactly these sources of news reside in a macroeconomic model
and consequently, the quantitative significance of news shocks is still an open question. Our
findings suggest a significant role for news shocks lies within propagation channels that are
tightly linked with financial intermediation. And in addition to broad based comovement—in
the main macroeconomic aggregates—the issue of sectoral comovement in response to news is
a demanding challenge as illustrated by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). It should thus come as
no surprise that sectoral co-movement has been almost entirely neglected in the news shocks
literature. Our paper makes headway in that direction as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some stylized facts
on sectoral co-movement in US data. Section 3 describes the model economy. Section 4 de-
scribes the estimation methodology and data. Section 5 reports estimation results. Section 6
quantifies the importance of different structural shocks as driving forces for aggregate fluctua-
tions. Section 7 discusses the propagation of valuation shocks while section 8 compares them
with financial market measures of lending and default risk. Section 10 discusses the impact of
anticipated and unanticipated shocks from a historical perspective. Section 11 concludes.
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Figure 1: Total hours (black, dashed), consumption sector hours (blue, dotted) and investment sec-
tor hours (red, solid) (per capita average weekly hours times employees). Left figure: HP1600
detrended series. Right figure: Demeaned time series in levels. See the data Appendix for a de-
scription of the sectoral hours series.
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Table 1: Peak to trough change of aggregate and sectoral hours in recessions
Total Hours Consumption Sector Investment Sector
1990Q3 – 1991Q1 -0.020 -0.007 -0.029
2001Q1 – 2001Q4 -0.042 -0.020 -0.063
2007Q4 – 2009Q2 -0.097 -0.054 -0.149
Total hours are non-farm business sector in per capita terms. The series for sectoral hours are
non-farm average weekly hours times employees in per capita terms. See the data Appendix for a
description of the sectoral hours series.
2 Evidence on sectoral co-movement
This section provides a brief description of the relationship between sectoral macroeconomic
variables and real GDP. Table 2 reports cross correlations of HP de-trended sectoral hours
worked and sectoral investment (only available at an annual frequency) with real GDP. It is
immediately apparent that all sectoral variables co-move very strongly with real GDP. The
contemporaneous correlation of hours worked in both sectors with GDP is approximately of
similar magnitude, about 0.81. Sectoral hours worked appear to lag real GDP by one or two
quarters. The sectoral investment series are also very strongly correlated with real GDP. In-
vestment flows produced for the consumption sector are more strongly correlated compared to
investment flows produced for use in the investment sector.
Sectoral co-movement of inputs and outputs is a pervasive stylized fact of business cycles
as documented in earlier work, yet existing one sector macroeconomic models have been over-
looking sectoral fluctuations. A multi sector approach may thus provide better clues on the
importance of various and often competing sources of fluctuations. Previous work has consid-
ered multi sectoral environments. Important contributions in this area include, but not limited
to, Long and Plosser (1983), Huffman and Wynne (1999), Horvath (1998), Horvath (2000),
Hornstein and Praschnik (1997). This early work has focused on real business cycle frame-
works with real shocks and frictions using a variety of assumptions on input–output linkages.
Huffman and Wynne (1999) demonstrated the difficulty of a standard two sector RBC model
with free factor mobility to produce sectoral co-movement in response to TFP shocks. More
recently, researchers have appealed to the richer structure and implications of multiple sector
models to address a variety of questions. Boldrin et al. (2001) use a two sector model with
limited factor mobility calibrated to the U.S. economy to account for the risk free rate and eq-
uity premium puzzles. Ireland and Schuh (2008), investigate the productivity performance of
the U.S. highlighting technological differences across sectors. Guerrieri et al. (2010) provide
conditions for an accurate interpretation of investment specific shocks using information from
the Input-Output Tables.4
4Others introduce the multi sector structure to New Keynesian environments (see for example, Edge et al.
(2008), DiCecio (2009), Buakez et al. (2009)).
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Table 2: Cross-Correlation of aggregate and sectoral variables with real GDP
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6
Total Hours -0.174 -0.049 0.129 0.304 0.486 0.685 0.861 0.878 0.816 0.680 0.495 0.308 0.121
Consumption sector hours -0.275 -0.154 0.004 0.168 0.358 0.579 0.801 0.859 0.840 0.749 0.578 0.412 0.236
Investment sector hours -0.210 -0.099 0.062 0.225 0.409 0.616 0.819 0.865 0.821 0.708 0.551 0.389 0.219
Total Investment 0.244 0.027 -0.159 -0.346 -0.310 0.144 0.841 0.636 0.048 -0.301 -0.446 -0.367 -0.097
Consumption sector Investment 0.136 -0.015 -0.114 -0.290 -0.257 0.169 0.842 0.684 0.145 -0.177 -0.337 -0.340 -0.170
Investment sector Investment 0.323 0.072 -0.182 -0.343 -0.311 0.084 0.668 0.449 -0.079 -0.389 -0.487 -0.325 0.011
Total hours are non-farm business sector in per capital terms. The series for sectoral hours are non-farm average weekly hours times
employees expressed in per capita terms. Statistics for hours are calculated from quarterly per capita HP1600 detrended series.
Investment series are annual per capita chained investment in private fixed assets. Statistics are calculated from HP100 detrended
series. Sample for the hours series is 1990Q2-2011Q1. Sample for the investment series is 1990-2010. See the data Appendix for
details.
3 The Model
The model is a two sector economy with various real and nominal frictions and financial inter-
mediaries that engage in transforming deposits from households to loans for firms in the two
sectors. The sectors in the model produce consumption goods and investment goods. The latter
are long-lived and are used as capital inputs in each sectors’ production process, while the for-
mer are non-storable and enter only into consumers utility functions. To allocate a sector to the
consumption or investment category, we used the 2005 Input-Output tables. The Input-Output
tables track the flows of goods and services across industries and record the final use of each
industry’s output into three broad categories: consumption, investment and intermediate uses
(as well as net exports and government). First, we determine how much of a 2-digit indus-
try’s final output goes to consumption as opposed to investment or intermediate uses. Then
we adopt the following criterion: if the majority of an industry’s final output is allocated to
final consumption demand it is classified as a consumption sector; otherwise, if the majority
of an industry’s output is allocated to investment or intermediate demand, it is classified as an
investment sector. Using this criterion, the mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation
and utilities, information and wholesale trade industries are classified as the investment sector,
and finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE), retail trade and services industries are classified
as the consumption sector.5
The model includes eight different types of economic agents: A continuum of households
that consume, save in interest bearing deposits and supply labor on a monopolistically compet-
itive labor market. Employment agencies aggregate different types of labor to a homogenous
aggregate for intermediate goods production. A continuum of intermediate goods firms pro-
duce investment and consumption goods in two distinct sectors using labor and capital services
as inputs. They rent labor services from the employment agencies and rent capital services on
a perfectly competitive market from capital services producers. Final goods producers aggre-
gate intermediate producers output in each sector. Physical capital producers in each sector use
a fraction of investment goods and existing capital to produce new capital goods. Financial
intermediaries accept deposits from households and finance capital acquisitions from capital
services producers. A monetary policy authority controls the short-run nominal interest rate.
5We have checked whether there is any migration of 2-digit industries across sectors for our sample. The only
industry which changes classification (from consumption to investment) during the sample is “information” which
for the majority of the sample can be classified as investment and we classify it as such.
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3.1 Intermediate goods producers
3.1.1 Intermediate goods producer’s production and cost minimization
Intermediate goods in the consumption sector are produced by a monopolist according to the
production function
Ct(i) = max
n
At(LC;t(i))
1 ac(KC;t(i))ac   AtV
ac
1 ai
t FC ; 0
o
:
Intermediate goods in the investment sector are produced by a monopolist according to the
production function
It(i) = max
n
Vt(LI;t(i))
1 ai(KI;t(i))ai   V
1
1 ai
t FI ; 0
o
;
where Kx;t(i) and Lx;t(i) denote the amount of capital and labor services rented by firm i in
sector x = C; I and ac; ai 2 (0; 1) denote the share of capital in the respective production
function. Fixed costs of production, FC ; FI > 0, ensure that profits are zero along a non-
stochastic balanced growth path and allow us to dispense with the entry and exit of intermediate
good producers (Christiano et al. (2005), Rotemberg and Woodford (1995)).6 The variable At
represents the non-stationary level of TFP in the consumption sector and its growth rate, zt =
ln

At
At 1

, follows the process:
zt = (1  z)ga + zzt 1 + "zt ; (1)
Similarly, Vt is the non-stationary level of TFP in the investment sector and its growth rate,
vt = ln

Vt
Vt 1

follows the process
vt = (1  v)gv + vvt 1 + "vt ; (2)
Here, "zt and "
v
t are i:i:d: N(0; 
2
z) and N(0; 
2
v), respectively. The parameters ga and gv are
the steady state growth rates of the two TFP processes above and z; v 2 (0; 1) determine the
persistence of these processes.
3.1.2 Intermediate goods producer’s pricing decisions
A constant fraction p;x of intermediate firms in sector x = C; I cannot choose their price
optimally in period t but reset their price — as in Calvo (1983) — according to the indexation
rule
PC;t(i) = PC;t 1(i)
pC
C;t 1
1 pC
C ;
PI;t(i) = PI;t 1(i)
pI
I;t 1
1 pI
I
h At
At 1
 1 Vt
Vt 1
 1 ac
1 ai
ipI
;
where C;t  PC;tPC;t 1 and I;t 
PI;t
PI;t 1

At
At 1
 1
Vt
Vt 1
 1 ac
1 ai is gross inflation in the two sectors
and C , I denote steady state values and where the factor that appears in the investment sector
expression corrects for investment specific progress.
6The fixed costs are assumed to grow at the same rate as output in the consumption and investment sector to
ensure that they do not become asymptotically negligible.
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The remaining fraction of firms, (1  p;x), in sector x = C; I can adjust the price in period
t. Firms in both sectors choose their price optimally by maximizing the present discounted
value of future profits. The resulting aggregate price index in the consumption sector is
PC;t =

(1  p;C) ~P
1
Cp;t
C;t + p;C
C;t 1
t
pC

1 pC
C PC;t 1
 1
Cp;t
Cp;t
:
The aggregate price index in the investment sector is
PI;t =

(1  p;I) ~P
1
Ip;t
I;t + p;I

PI;t 1
I;t 1
t
pI

1 pI
I
h At
At 1
 1 Vt
Vt 1
 1 ac
1 ai
ipI 1Ip;t Ip;t :
3.2 Final goods producers
Final goods, Ct and It, in the consumption and investment sector respectively, are produced by
perfectly competitive firms combining a continuum—Ct(i) and It(i)—of intermediate goods,
according to the technology:
Ct =
"Z 1
0
(Ct(i))
1
1+Cp;t di
#1+Cp;t
; It =
"Z 1
0
(It(i))
1
1+Ip;t di
#1+Ip;t
;
The elasticity xp;t, x = C; I is the time varying price markup over marginal cost for intermedi-
ate firms. It is assumed to follow the exogenous stochastic process
log(1 + xp;t) = (1  xp) log(1 + xp) + xp log(1 + xp;t 1) + "xp;t;
where xp 2 (0; 1) and "xp;t is i:i:d: N(0; 2xp), with x = C; I . Shocks to xp;t can be interpreted
as mark-up (or cost-push) shocks to the inflation equation.
Profit maximization and the zero profit condition for final good firms imply that the prices
of the final goods in the consumption and investment sector, PC;t and PI;t, are CES aggregates
of the prices of intermediate goods in the respective sector, PC;t(i) and PI;t(i),
PC;t =
"Z 1
0
PC;t(i)
1
Cp;t di
#Cp;t
; PI;t =
"Z 1
0
PI;t(i)
1
Ip;t di
#Ip;t
:
3.3 Households
3.3.1 Household’s utility and budget constraint
Households consist of two types of members, workers and bankers. At any point in time,
there is a fraction 1   f that are workers and f that are bankers. The workers supply (spe-
cialized) labor and earn wages while the bankers manage a financial intermediary. Both mem-
ber types return their respective earnings back to the household. This set-up is identical to
Gertler and Karadi (2011) except for the fact that workers have monopoly power in setting
wages. The household maximize the utility function,
E0
1X
t=0
tbt
"
ln(Ct   hCt 1)  '(LC;t(j) + LI;t(j))
1+
1 + 
#
;  2 (0; 1); ' > 0;  > 0;
(3)
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where E0 is the conditional expectation operator,  is the discount factor and h is the degree of
(external) habit formation. The inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity is denoted by  while '
is a free parameter which allows to calibrate total labor supply in the steady state to be unity.
Due to the non-stationarity of technological (TFP) progress, utility is logarithmic to ensure the
existence of a balanced growth path. Consumption is not indexed by (j) because the existence
of state contingent securities ensures that in equilibrium, consumption and asset holdings are
the same for all households. The variable bt is a intertemporal preference shock, which affects
both the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility of labor. It is assumed to
follow the stochastic process,
log bt = b log bt 1 + "bt ; (4)
where b 2 (0; 1) and "bt is i:i:d N(0; 2b ).
The household’s flow budget constraint (in consumption units) is
Ct +
Bt
PC;t
 Wt(j)
PC;t
(LC;t(j) + LI;t(j)) +Rt 1
Bt 1
PC;t
  Tt
PC;t
+
Qt(j)
PC;t
+
t
PC;t
; (5)
whereBt is holdings of bank deposits (which are risk free and equivalent to government bonds),
Qt is the net cash flow from household’s portfolio of state contingent securities, Tt is lump-sum
taxes, Rt the nominal interest rate paid on deposits and t is the per-capita profit accruing to
households from ownership of all firms. Notice above the wage rate, Wt, is identical across
sectors due to perfect labor mobility.
3.3.2 Employment agencies
Each household j 2 [0; 1] supplies specialized labor, Lt(j), monopolistically as in Erceg et al.
(2000). A large number of competitive “employment agencies” aggregate this specialized labor
into a homogenous labor input which is sold to intermediate goods producers in a competitive
market. Aggregation is done according to the following function:
Lt =
"Z 1
0
Lt(j)
1
1+w;t dj
#1+w;t
:
The desired markup of wages over the household’s marginal rate of substitution, w;t, follows
the exogenous stochastic process
log(1 + w;t) = (1  w) log(1 + w) + w log(1 + w;t 1) + "w;t;
where w 2 (0; 1) and "w;t is i:i:d: N(0; 2w). The expression w;t is the wage markup shock
which can also be interpreted as a labor supply shock since it has the same effect on the house-
hold’s first-order condition for the choice of hours as the shock to the preference for leisure
popularized by Hall (1997).
Profit maximization by the perfectly competitive employment agencies implies the labor
demand function
Lt(j) =
Wt(j)
Wt
  1+w;t
w;t Lt; (6)
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where Wt(j) is the wage received from employment agencies by the supplier of labor of type
j, while the wage paid by intermediate firms for their homogenous labor input is
Wt =
"Z 1
0
Wt(j)
1
w;t dj
#w;t
:
3.3.3 Household’s wage setting
Following Erceg et al. (2000), in each period, a fraction w of the households cannot freely
adjust its wage but follows the indexation rule.
Wt+1(j) = Wt(j)

c;te
zt+
ac
1 ai vt
w
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
1 w
:
The remaining fraction of households, (1  w), chooses an optimal wage,Wt(j), by maximiz-
ing7
Et
( 1X
s=0
sw
s
"
  bt+s'Lt+s(j)
1+
1 + 
+ t+sWt(j)Lt+s(j)
#)
;
subject to the labor demand function (6). The aggregate wage evolves according to
Wt =
(
(1  w)( ~Wt)
1
w + w
h
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
1 w
c;t 1e
zt 1+ ac1 ai vt 1
w
Wt 1
i 1
w
)w
;
where ~Wt is the optimally chosen wage.
3.4 Capital services producers
There is a perfectly competitive sector with capital services producers that transform physical
capital to effective capital. At the end of period t capital services producers in sector x = C; I ,
purchase physical capital KC;t or KI;t from physical capital goods producers in the respective
sector at price QC;t or QI;t (described in the next section). At the beginning of the next period,
capital services producers set the utilization rate of capital. The utilization rate, ux;t, transforms
available capital into effective capital according to
Kx;t = ux;t
K
x;t
Kx;t 1; x = C; I;
Capital services producers incur costs when setting utilization, which are denoted by a(ux;t)
per unit of capital. This function has the properties that in the steady state u = 1, a(1) = 0
and   a00(1)
a0(1) , where "
0"s denote differentiation. Capital services producers rent the effective
capital in perfectly competitive markets to intermediate goods produces and earn a rental rate
equal to RKx;t=PC;t per unit of capital.
7All households that can reoptimize will choose the same wage. The probability to be able to adjust the wage,
(1   w), can be seen as a reduced-form representation of wage rigidities with a broader microfoundation; for
example quadratic adjustment costs (Calvo (1983)), information frictions (Mankiw, N. Gregory and Reis, Ricardo
(2002), Sims (2003)) and contract costs (Caplin and Leahy (1997)).
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In the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2011) we introduce a shock to the quality of capital, Kx;t,
in each sector x and assume it evolves according to
log Kx;t = K ;x log 
K
x;t + "
K
x;t ; x = C; I;
where K ;x 2 (0; 1). This disturbance (as shown below) directly affects the value of capital
and will be called valuation shock. 8
We moreover assume the innovation of the shock process consists of two components.9
"
K
x;t = "
K;0
x;t + "
K;news
x;t ; x = C; I; (7)
where the first component, "
K;0
x;t , is unanticipated and the second component, "
K;news
x;t , is antic-
ipated or news. News can be anticipated several quarters ahead so that
"
K;news
x;t 
HX
h=1
"
K;h
x;t h;
where "
K;h
x;t h is a signal (or news) received by agents in period t h about the quality of capital
in period t. H is the maximum horizon over which agents can receive advance information
(anticipation horizon). It is assumed that the anticipated and unanticipated components for sec-
tor x = C; I and horizon h = 0; 1; : : : ; H are i:i:d: with N(0; 2
K;h;x
) and uncorrelated across
sector, horizon and time. Note the process above also allows for revisions in expectations. In
other words, a signal received t h periods in advance can later be revised by an updated signal
received at t  h+ 1; :::t  1: or by the unanticipated component, "K;0x;t .
Capital services producers in period t + 1 in sector x = C; I choose the utilization rate of
capital to solve,
max
ux;t+1

RKx;t+1
PC;t+1
ux;t+1
K
x;t+1
Kx;t   a(ux;t+1)Kx;t+1 Kx;tAt+1V
ac 1
1 ai
t+1

The resulting first order condition for sector x = C; I is
rKx;t+1 = a
0(ux;t+1); with rKx;t+1 =
RKx;t+1
PC;t+1
V
1 ac
1 ai
t+1 A
 1
t+1:
Capital services producers purchase physical capital at the end of period t at price Qx;t and
sell the un-depreciated component at the end of period t + 1 at price Qx;t+1 to the physical
capital producers. Hence, total receipts of capital services producers in period t + 1 are equal
to:
RKx;t+1
PC;t+1
ux;t+1
K
x;t+1
Kx;t   a(ux;t+1)Kx;t+1 Kx;tAt+1V
ac 1
1 ai
t+1 + (1  x)Qx;t+1 Kx;t;
8Recently this type of exogenous variation to the value of capital has enjoyed increasing popularity in
macroeconomic models. Other studies that include a valuation shock include for example Gourio (2009),
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler et al. (2011).
9News shocks are introduced in a similar way for example in Davis (2007), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010),
Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) and Fujiwara et al. (2011).
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which can be expressed as
RBx;t+1Qx;t
Kx;t (8)
with
RBx;t+1 =
RKx;t+1
Px;t+1
Kx;t+1ux;t+1 +Qx;t+1
K
x;t+1(1  x)  a(ux;t+1)Kx;t+1At+1V
ac 1
1 ai
t+1
Qx;t
; x = C; I;
where RBx;t+1 is the rate of return on capital for capital services producers. Since the latter
finance their purchase of capital at the end of each period with funds from financial interme-
diaries (to be described below), RBx;t+1 is also the stochastic return for financial intermediaries
in sector x = C; I . Note that the valuation shock, Kx;t+1 is a source of variation in the return
to capital. Consequently, the process we have adopted for the valuation shock implies that this
return will in general depend on beliefs about the expected future path of Kx;t+j .
3.5 Physical capital producers
Capital producers in sector x = C; I use a fraction of investment goods from final goods pro-
ducers and undepreciated capital stock from capital services producers (as described above) to
produce new capital goods, subject to investment adjustment costs as proposed by Christiano et al.
(2005). These new capital goods are then sold in perfectly competitive capital goods markets to
capital services producers for use in period t+1. The technology available for physical capital
production is given as:
O0x;t = Ox;t +

1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

Ix;t
where Ox;t denotes the amount of used capital at the end of period t, O0x;t the new capital
available for use at the beginning of period t+1. The investment adjustment cost function S()
satisfies the following: S(1) = S 0(1) = 0 and S 00(1) =  > 0, where "0"s denote differentiation.
The investment adjustment cost make the optimization problem of capital producers in sector
x = C; I dynamic. Formally,
max
Ix;t;Ox;t
Et
1X
t=0
tt

Qx;t

Ox;t +

1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

Ix;t

 Qx;tOx;t   PI;t
PC;t
Ix;t

;
where Qx;t denotes the price of capital (i.e. the value of installed capital in consumption units).
The first order condition for investment goods is
PI;t
PC;t
=Qx;t
"
1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

  S 0
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1
#
+ EtQx;t+1
t+1
t
"
S 0
Ix;t+1
Ix;t
Ix;t+1
Ix;t
2#
:
From the capital producer’s problem it is evident that any value of Ox;t is profit maximizing.
Let x 2 (0; 1) denote the depreciation rate of capital and Kx;t 1 the capital stock available at
the beginning of period t in sector x = C; I . Then setting Ox;t = (1  )Kx;t Kx;t 1 implies the
available capital stock in sector x, evolves according to
Kx;t = (1  x)Kx;t Kx;t 1 +

1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

Ix;t; x = C; I; (9)
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Notice the setup above with separate capital producers for the investment and the consumption
sector and the separate capital accumulation equations. The latter imply that installed capital
is immobile across the two sectors and only newly produced capital can be re-allocated across
sectors.
3.6 Financial sector
3.6.1 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries (banks) use deposits from households and their own equity capital to
lend funds to capital services producers. Moreover, intermediaries face an exogenous i:i:d:
probability of exit in each period. Because we work with a two sector model we assume bank-
ing is segmented; there are two continua of banks which provide specialized lending either to
capital services producers in the consumption or capital services producers in the investment
sector. In other words, we assume there are specialized intermediaries for financing each sector.
Once it is determined that a household member is a banker the probability that she is specialized
to lend in sector x = C; I is equal across sectors and independent across time. The implemen-
tation of banks and their role as financial intermediaries in our two sector model is based on
the framework developed in Gertler and Karadi (2011) using a standard one sector model, so
we only briefly describe it here (Appendix A describes all the equations).10 The balance sheet
of a bank that specializes to lend in sector x = C; I is,
Qx;tSx;t = Nx;t +
Bx;t
PC;t
; x = C; I;
where Sx;t denotes the quantity of financial claims on capital services producers held by the
intermediary and Qx;t denotes the price per unit of such claims. The variable Nx;t denotes the
bank’s equity capital (or wealth) at the end of period t and Bx;t are households deposits.
Financial intermediaries are limited from infinitely borrowing funds from households by
a moral hazard/costly enforcement problem. Bankers, at the beginning of each period, can
choose to divert a fraction B of available funds and transfer it back to the household they
belong. Depositors can force the bank into bankruptcy and recover a fraction 1  B of assets.
Note that the fraction, B, which bankers can divert is the same across sectors to guarantee that
the household is indifferent between depositing funds to either type of bank.
Financial intermediaries maximize expected terminal wealth, i.e. the discounted sum of
future equity capital of surviving intermediaries. The moral hazard/costly enforcement problem
constraints the bank’s ability to acquire assets because it introduces an endogenous leverage
constraint. In this case the quantity of assets which the intermediary can acquire depends on
the equity capital, Nx;t, as well as the intermediary’s leverage ratio, %x;t. This leverage ratio is
the ratio of the bank’s intermediated assets to equity and is a function of the marginal gains of
expanding assets (holding equity constant), expanding equity (holding assets constant), and the
10It is important to highlight that banks in either sector are symmetric. Their performance and hence the
evolution of equity capital differs between them because the demand for capital differs across sectors resulting
in sector specific prices of capital, Qx;t, and rates of return for capital. Moreover the institutional setup of banks
does not depend on firm-specific factors. Gertler and Karadi (2011) show this latter fact implies an equivalent
formulation with a representative bank.
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gain from diverting assets. Formally,
Qx;tSx;t = %x;tNx;t; (10)
where Sx;t denotes the quantity of financial claims held by the intermediary and Qx;t denotes
the price of a claim in sector x.
Financial intermediaries which exit the industry can be replaced by new entering banks.
Therefore, total wealth of financial intermediaries is the sum of the equity capital of existing,
N ex;t, and new banks, N
n
x;t.
Nx;t = N
e
x;t +N
n
x;t:
The fraction B of bankers at t  1 which survive until t is equal across sectors. Then, the law
of motion for the equity capital of existing bankers in sector x = C; I is given by
N ex;t =B[(R
B
x;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]Nx;t 1; 0 < B < 1: (11)
where a main source of fluctuations is the ex-post excess return on assets, RBx;t   Rt 1. The
impact of the latter on N ex;t is increasing in the leverage ratio.
New entering banks receive startup funds from households equal to a small fraction of the
value of assets held by the existing banks in their final operating period. Given that the exit
probability is i:i:d., the value of assets held by the existing bankers in their final operating
period is given by (1  B)Qx;tSx;t. The household transfers a fraction, $, of this value to the
new intermediaries in the two sectors which leads to the following equations for new banker’s
wealth
Nnx;t = $Qx;tSx;t; 0 < $ < 1: (12)
Existing banker’s equity capital (A.4) and entering banker’s equity capital (A.5) lead to the law
of motion for total equity capital
Nx;t =
 
B[(R
B
x;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]Nx;t 1 +$Qx;tSx;t

&x;t;
where &x;t is a shock to the bank’s equity capital. This shock evolves according to
log &x;t = &x log &x;t 1 + 
&
x;t; x = C; I
where &x 2 (0; 1) and &x;t is i:i:d N(0; 2&x).
It is useful to define the finance (or risk) premium on assets earned by banks in sector x = C; I ,
as
Rx;t = R
B
x;t+1  Rt: (13)
Sources of variation inRBx;t+1. It is instructive to examine the factors that potentially affect
the return to capital and consequently the risk premium on assets, using the expression for the
return to capital derived in Appendix B (where lower case letters denote stationary variables),
RBx;t+1 =
rKx;t+1ux;t+1 + qx;t+1(1  x)  a(ux;t+1)
qx;t
Kx;t+1e
zte
  1 ac
1 ai vt ;
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In addition to variation arising from the value of capital, qx;t+1, two exogenous factors
directly affect this return, namely, TFP shocks in consumption, zt, and investment sectors, vt,
as well as the valuation shock, Kx;t+1. Of course this return—as the price of capital—will
also be in principle affected by all other shocks in the model. For example, a positive TFP
shock in the consumption sector would, other things equal, raise the return to capital as the
consumption sector demands more capital services and raises the value of capital. On the other
hand a positive valuation shock implies the quality of effective capital services rented by capital
services producers improves, this also acts as a booster in the return to capital by raising the
value of capital.
3.6.2 Financing capital acquisitions by capital services producers
Capital services producers in sector x, acquire physical capital Kx;t at the end of period t,
and sell the capital on the open market again at the end of period t + 1. This acquisition of
capital is financed by financial intermediaries in the respective sector. To acquire the funds to
buy capital, capital services producers issue SC;t or SI;t claims equal to the number of units of
physical capital acquired, KC;t or KI;t. They price each claim at the price of a unit of capital
QC;t or QI;t. Then by arbitrage the following constraint holds:
Qx;t Kx;t = Qx;tSx;t;
where the left hand side stands for the value of physical capital acquired and the right hand
side represents the value of claims against this capital. In contrast to the relationship between
households and banks which is characterized by the moral hazard/costly enforcement problem,
we assume—in line with Gertler and Karadi (2011)—there are no frictions in the process of
intermediation between non-financial firms and banks. Notice the assumptions above imply fi-
nancial intermediaries carry all the risk when lending to capital services producers—effectively
capital services producers earn zero return. Using the assumptions in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
we can interpret these claims as one period state-contingent bonds which allows interpreting
the risk premium defined in equation 13 as a corporate bond spread.
3.7 Monetary policy
The nominal interest rate Rt set by the monetary authority follows a feedback rule of the form
Rt
R
=
Rt 1
R
Rht

 t
t 1
 Yt
Yt 1
Y i1 R
mp;t; R; ; ; Y 2 (0; 1);
where R is the steady state gross nominal interest rate and (Yt=Yt 1) is the gross growth in real
GDP. The interest rate responds to deviations of inflation from its target level, inflation growth
and real GDP growth and is subject to a monetary policy IID shock mp;t.
3.8 Market clearing
The resource constraint in the consumption sector is
Ct + (a(uC;t)
K
C;t
KC;t 1 + a(uI;t)KI;t KI;t 1)
AtV
ac
1 ai
t
V
1
1 ai
t
= AtL
1 ac
c;t K
ac
c;t   AtV
ac
1 ai
t FC :
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The resource constraint in the investment sector ish
I I;t + I
 
C;t
i  1

= VtL
1 ai
I;t K
ai
I;t   V
1
1 ai
t FI :
Notice in specifying the resource constraint in the investment sector we, following Huffman and Wynne
(1999), allow (but not require) for the realistic possibility that investment goods may be sector
specific to some degree, i.e. imperfect substitutes in production. In other words, investment
goods produced for the investment sector may not be costlessly converted for use in the con-
sumption sector. There are many examples that can fit this description. The parameter that
captures the elasticity of substitution is given by,  1   <  1. For  =  1, we obtain a
standard resource constraint for the investment sector (i.e. perfectly substitutable investment
goods), while  <  1, implies a cost for quickly changing the composition of investment
goods across sectors. We estimate this parameter and thus let the data speak on this dimension.
Moreover,
Lt = LI;t + LC;t; It =
h
I I;t + I
 
C;t
i  1

and Kt = KI;t +KC;t:
Output (GDP in consumption units) is defined as
Yt = Ct +
PI;t
PC;t
It + et:
where et denotes GDP measurement error. We assume that this measurement error in GDP
evolves according to
log et = (1  e) log e+ e log et 1 + "et ;
where e 2 (0; 1) and "et is i:i:d: N(0; 2e). This measurement error is used to capture un-
modelled output movements (such as government spending/net exports which we abstract from
in the model).
4 Data and Methodology
We estimate the model using quarterly US data (1990 Q2 - 2011 Q1) on eleven macroeconomic
and financial market variables. Specifically we use data on output, consumption, investment,
hours worked, wages, nominal interest rate, consumption sector and investment sector inflation.
In addition we include measures of risk premia using non-financial corporate bond spreads
and a measure of banks’ equity capital. A corporate bond spread is defined as the difference
between a corporate bond’s yield and the yield of an identical maturity U.S. Treasury bond.
Specifically, we compute spreads for corporate bonds issued by companies classified as oper-
ating in the consumption and investment sector.11 All nominal series—except investment, the
11This information is provided by Datastream. Another advantage of using bond spreads as observables
is that unlike other financial variables, like stock prices for example, these variables are less noisy and have
high predictive power for macroeconomic aggregates, such as output and investment as for example shown
by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011). In addition to their predictive power, credit spreads may also include risk
premia. However, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) argue that this possibility is very unlikely. In line with
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011) we only consider bonds with a rating above investment grade and maturity longer
than one and shorter than 30 years. We also exclude all credit spreads below 10 and above 5000 basis points
to ensure that the time series are not driven by a small number of extreme observations. To generate the credit
spread series for the consumption/investment sector, we aggregate the spreads of 1213/4163 bonds and take the
arithmetic average.
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nominal interest rate, inflation rates and corporate bond spreads—are expressed in real terms
by dividing with the consumption deflator. Moreover, output, consumption, investment and
hours worked are expressed in per capita terms by dividing with civilian non-institutional pop-
ulation aged 16 and over. We define nominal consumption as the sum of personal consumption
expenditures on nondurable goods and services. As in Justiniano et al. (2010), we define nom-
inal gross investment as the sum of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods and
gross private domestic investment. Real consumption is obtained by dividing the nominal series
with the consumption deflator while real investment is obtained by dividing the nominal series
with the investment deflator. Real wages are defined as compensation per hour in the non-farm
business sector divided by the consumption deflator. Hours worked is the log of hours of all
persons in the non-farm business sector, divided by the population. Consumption (investment)
sector inflation is measured as the quarterly log difference in the consumption (investment)
chain weighted deflator. The nominal interest rate series is the effective Federal Funds rate. We
measure total equity capital using information from (a) the Federal Reserve Board’s H8 release
on assets and liabilities of all U.S. commercial Banks and (b) Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council report of conditions and income of all U.S. insured commercial banks.
All data except the interest rate and credit spreads are in logs and seasonally adjusted. The
limited availability of credit spread data for the 1980s is a factor that restricts the sample for
the estimation (see Appendix F for details on data construction). The vector of observables we
use in the estimation is given as
Yt =

 log Yt; logCt; log It; logWt; C;t; I;t; logLt; Rt; R

C;t; R

I;t; logNt

: (14)
where  denotes the first-difference operator. Finally we demean the data prior to estimation.
We use the Bayesian methodology to estimate model parameters. This methodology is
now extensively used in estimating DSGE models (see Schorfheide (2000), Smets and Wouters
(2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Levin et al. (2005), and Del Negro et al. (2007) for early
examples). Recent overviews are presented in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-Villaverde
(2009). This methodology combines prior information with the likelihood function of the sta-
tionary model to obtain the posterior distribution of model parameters. The key steps in this
methodology are as follows. Let  denote the vector that contains all the structural parameters
of the model. The non-sample information is summarized with a prior distribution with density
p().12 The sample information (conditional on versionMi of the DSGE model) is contained
in the likelihood function, p(YT j;Mi), where YT = [Y1; :::; YT ]0 contains the data. The
likelihood function allows one to update the prior distribution of , p(). Then, using Bayes’
theorem, we can express the posterior distribution of the parameters as
p(jYT ;Mi) = p(YT j;Mi)p()
p(YT jMi) (15)
where the denominator, p(YT jMi) =
R
p(;YT jMi)d, in (15) is the marginal data density
conditional on modelMi. In Bayesian analysis the marginal data density constitutes a measure
of model fit with two dimensions: goodness of in-sample fit and a penalty for model complex-
ity. The posterior distribution of parameters is evaluated numerically using the random walk
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We simulate the posterior using a sample of 500,000 draws
12We assume that parameters are a priori independent from each other. This is a widely used assumption in the
applied DSGE literature and implies the joint prior distribution equals the product of marginal priors.
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and use this (after dropping the first 20% of the draws) to (i) report the mean, and the 10 and
90 percentiles of the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters and (ii) evaluate the
marginal likelihood of the model.13 All estimations are done using DYNARE.14
4.1 Prior distributions
We use prior distributions that conform to the assumptions used in Smets and Wouters (2007),
Justiniano et al. (2010), and Justiniano et al. (2011). The first five columns in Table 1 list the
parameters and the assumptions on the prior distributions. A number of parameters are held
fixed prior to estimation. We set the quarterly depreciation rate to be equal across sectors,
C = I = 0:025. From the steady state restriction  = C=R, we set  = 0:9974. The
shares of capital in the production functions, aC and aI , are fixed at 0.36. The steady state
values for the ratio of nominal investment to consumption is calibrated to be consistent with
the average value in the data. We also calibrate the steady state (deterministic) growth of TFP
in the consumption/investment sectors in line with the sample average growth rates of output
in the two sectors. This yields ga = 0:1% and gv = 0:4% per quarter.
There are three parameters specific to financial intermediation. The parameter B, which
determines the banker’s average life span does not have a direct empirical counterpart and is
fixed at 0:96.15 This value implies an average survival time of bankers of slightly over six
years. The parameters $ and B are fixed at values which guarantee that the steady state risk
premium (the average of spreads across the two sectors) and the steady state leverage ratio
matches their empirical counterparts. The average of the consumption sector and investment
sector credit spreads are each equal to 50 basis points. The average leverage ratio in the data is
computed from the ratio of adjusted assets to equity for all U.S. insured commercial banks. To
compute adjusted assets we exclude loans to consumers, real estate and holdings of government
bonds from total intermediary assets to arrive at a value which is more in line with the model
concept. Over the sample period, data for adjusted assets and equity from all U.S. insured
commercial banks imply an average leverage ratio of 5.47. This value is considerably smaller
compared to the ratio of total assets to equity, which is equal to 11.52 (see Appendix F for a
more detailed description). All parameter values which are fixed during the estimation and the
steady state relationships used to derive these are summarized in Table 3. All other parameters
are estimated.
The assumptions about the distributions for the parameters of the utility function are stan-
dard. The parameter governing the habit persistence, h, follows a Beta distribution with mean
0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. The inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity, , is assumed to have
a Gamma distribution with mean 2.0 and standard deviation 0.75.
The price and wage setting parameters are assumed to have Beta distributions. The mean
of the Calvo price and wage probabilities (0.66) implies an average length of price and wage
contracts of three quarters and the standard error allows for variation between about six months
and one year. Note that these distributions do not imply any price heterogeneity across sectors
before the model is taken to the data.
The elasticities of capital utilization in the consumption and investment sector are assumed
13We also calculate convergence diagnostics in order to check and ensure the stability of the posterior distribu-
tions of parameters as described in Brooks and Gelman (1998).
14http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.
15This is very similar to the values used by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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Table 3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
C 0.025 Consumption sector capital depreciation
I 0.025 Investment sector capital depreciation
ac 0.36 Consumption sector share of capital
aI 0.36 Investment sector share of capital
 0.9974 Discount factor
C 0.6722 Steady state consumption sector inflation
I 0.0245 Steady state investment sector inflation
p 0.1 Steady state price markup
w 0.1 Steady state wage markup
ga 0.001 Consumption sector average TFP growth
gv 0.004 Investment sector average TFP growth
pi
i
c 0.399 Steady state investment / consumption
B 0.96 Fraction of bankers that survive
$ 0.00089 Share of assets transferred to new bankers
B 0.3 Fraction of funds bankers can divert
% 5.47 Steady state leverage ratio
RB  R 0.005 Steady state risk premium
to follow a Gamma distribution with a mean of 5.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0. A Gamma
distribution is assumed for the parameter governing the (intertemporal) investment adjustment
costs with mean 4.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0. A new parameter we estimate is  which
determines the degree of intratemporal adjustment investment cost—as opposed to intertempo-
ral. We estimate a transformation of this parameter, given by  = 1 + 1

that lies in the (0,1)
interval and has a Beta distribution.
The assumptions regarding the parameters of the monetary policy rule are standard. The
parameter governing the persistence of the policy rule is assumed to follow a Beta distribution
with a mean of 0.6 and a standard deviation of 0.2. The long-run reaction coefficient of inflation
is Normal distributed with mean 1.7 and standard deviation 0.3. The feedback parameter for
the growth of GDP follows the same distribution with mean 0.125 and standard deviation 0.05.
Finally, the feedback parameter for the change in the inflation rate is assumed to follow a
Normal distribution with mean 0.25 and standard deviation 0.10.
Finally, all standard deviations of the contemporaneous and news shocks are assumed to be
distributed as an inverse Gamma distribution with a standard deviation of 2.0. Moreover, we
specify priors for the news components of valuation shocks such that the sum of the variance of
the anticipated components equal the variance of the respective unanticipated component. The
parameters determining the persistence of these shocks are bound between 0 and 1, where the
growth TFP shocks are assumed to have lower means compared to the stationary shocks.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Posterior Distributions
Table 4 reports the posterior mean and the 10% and 90% intervals of the estimated parame-
ters. Overall, the estimates are broadly consistent with earlier studies using one sector models,
e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007), Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) and Justiniano et al. (2010). We
estimate a considerable degree of habit formation (0.68), close (though slightly smaller) to the
estimates reported in DiCecio (2009) or Edge et al. (2008), studies using multi-sector models
for the U.S. economy. The estimate for  implies a Frisch labor supply elasticity of approxi-
mately 1.0.
The degree of price stickiness is estimated to be similar in the two sectors, though prices in
the consumption sector are slightly stickier compared to the investment sector. The estimates
of the Calvo parameters imply an average contract length in the investment sector of about
4.3 quarters, while on average contracts are renegotiated every 5.5 quarters in the consump-
tion sector. There is scattered evidence in the DSGE literature about sectoral price stickiness.
Using a different estimation methodology and sample, DiCecio (2009) finds that prices in the
consumption sector are more flexible than estimated here. The Calvo parameter for wage stick-
iness is very close to the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2007), Khan and Tsoukalas (2011)
and Justiniano et al. (2010), implying that on average wages are renegotiated approximately ev-
ery 3 quarters. DiCecio (2009) reports a slightly higher estimate for the Calvo wage probability.
The estimate for the (intertemporal) investment adjustment costs parameter (2.18) is broadly
similar to Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) (2.08) or Justiniano et al. (2010) (2.85) estimated using
one sector models. The transformed parameter that captures intratemporal adjustment costs is
estimated at 0.358. This maps into a value of -1.55 for , suggesting a mild degree of intratem-
poral adjustment costs in sectoral investment flows. As far as we know this is the first estimate
reported in the literature.
The monetary policy rule parameter estimates as well as the estimates for the persistence
parameters and standard deviations of the unanticipated shocks are in line with the values re-
ported in Smets and Wouters (2007), Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) and Justiniano et al. (2010).
Relative to earlier work on estimated DSGE models we estimate two new shocks that are
financial in nature. First, a shock to the equity capital of banks specialized in lending to sector
x = C; I . The posterior estimates for equity shocks suggest a shift from the prior mean. Sec-
ond, a valuation shock that affects the value (or quality) of assets of banks in sector x = C; I .
The valuation shock consists of unanticipated and anticipated (news) components. The latter
are assumed to arise four and eight quarters ahead in order to help economize on the state space
in estimation.16 As this is the first study to quantify the importance of these shocks, estimates
for the volatilities of these news shocks do not exist in the literature. The standard deviations
for the valuation news components are estimated to be around or above their unanticipated sec-
toral counterparts. In general the processes for the valuation shocks in the consumption sector
are estimated to be considerably more persistent compared to their counterparts in the invest-
ment sector. Similarly, the volatilities of the former are estimated to be larger compared to
their counterparts in the investment sector. This suggests that valuation shocks on consumption
sector assets may potentially play a larger role in accounting for fluctuations in macroeconomic
16Similar specifications about the anticipation horizon of news are considered in Khan and Tsoukalas (2011)
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010).
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aggregates and financial variables a question we now turn to examine.
6 Variance Decompositions
In this section we evaluate the relative contribution and importance of shocks in accounting for
fluctuations in the data. We perform several variance decomposition exercises. Table 5 presents
our first exercise. Focusing at business cycle frequencies, i.e. 4 to 32 quarter ahead horizons,
we can observe that financial shocks (i.e. equity and valuation shocks) account for about 31%,
28%, 28% of the forecast error variance in output growth, investment growth, and hours worked
respectively. They also account for a large share of the forecast error variance in the financial
variables. Specifically, they account for over 50% of the variance of total equity growth, about
80% of the variance in the consumption sector spread, and about 35% of the variance in the
investment sector spread. Within the set of financial shocks, valuation news shocks account for
an important share of the forecast error variance: 25%, 20%, 25%, in output growth, investment
growth and total hours worked respectively. Within valuation news shocks the most important
component is the eight quarter ahead shock in the consumption sector.
TFP shocks are also of considerable importance for fluctuations at business cycle frequen-
cies. TFP shocks in the investment and consumption sectors together account for about 19%,
11%, 36%, 20% of the fluctuations in output growth, consumption growth, investment growth
and hours worked respectively. Interestingly, TFP shocks of the investment specific type (i.e.
TFP shocks in the investment sector) account for a sizable fraction of fluctuations and thus more
important compared to consumption sector TFP. Specifically, they account for about 12%, 35%
and around 15-20% of the variance in output growth, investment growth and hours worked re-
spectively. The importance of TFP shocks of the investment specific type is in sharp contrast
to findings in earlier studies (e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010), Christiano et al. (2010))
that find shocks of this type are negligible sources of fluctuations. The reason for these appar-
ently contradicting findings is that these authors, identify the investment specific shock from
variation in the relative price of investment alone in one sector estimated DSGE models. This
restriction sharply limits the quantitative significance of these shocks. The essence of this ar-
gument can be demonstrated using the expression for the relative price of investment from the
model:
PI;t
PC;t
=
mark upI;t
mark upC;t
1  ac
1  ai
At
Vt
KI;t
LI;t
 aiKC;t
LC;t
ac
where, ac; ai are capital shares in consumption, and investment sector respectively. Vt; At
is TFP in the investment and consumption sector respectively, and Kx;t
Lx;t
; x = I; C the capital-
labor ratio in sector x. mark upx;t is the mark-up or inverse of the real marginal cost in sector
x. Vt corresponds to the investment specific shock. Notice how the relative price of investment
is driven—at least in the short run—by (a) mark up shocks, (b) TFP in both, the consumption
and the investment sector and (c) differences in capital labor ratios across sectors, due to the
limited mobility of capital between sectors. The fact that (c) above affects the relative price
of investment implies that all shocks can in principle affect this price. In a special case of
the model with: (i) perfectly competitive product markets, (ii) identical production functions
(factor intensities) in both sectors, (iii) free factor mobility, the expression above becomes,
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Table 4: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Parameter Description Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Distribution Mean Std. dev. Mean 10% 90%
h Consumption habit Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6864 0.6184 0.7550
 Inverse labour supply elasticity Gamma 2.00 0.75 1.0112 0.2691 1.7312
w Wage Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.6536 0.5853 0.7227
C C-sector price Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.8188 0.7537 0.8830
I I-sector price Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.7744 0.6663 0.8727
w Wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2608 0.1400 0.3802
pC C-sector price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2360 0.0992 0.3694
pI I-sector price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2689 0.1026 0.4235
I I-sector utilization Gamma 5.00 1.00 5.0041 3.3870 6.6031
C C-sector utilization Gamma 5.00 1.00 4.0646 2.4370 5.6471
 Investment adjustment cost Gamma 4.00 1.00 2.1795 1.5915 2.7923
 Taylor rule inflation Normal 1.70 0.30 2.2351 1.8988 2.5653
R Taylor rule inertia Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9036 0.8815 0.9269
 Taylor rule inflation growth Normal 0.25 0.10 0.1813 0.0314 0.3195
Y Taylor rule GDP growth Normal 0.125 0.05 0.2476 0.1636 0.3294
 Intratemporal investment adjustmet cost Beta 0.50 0.20 0.3578 0.1468 0.5834
Shocks:
Persistence
z C-sector TFP Beta 0.40 0.20 0.1483 0.0148 0.2750
v I-sector TFP Beta 0.40 0.20 0.2585 0.1289 0.3838
b Preference Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8225 0.7588 0.8867
e GDP measurement error Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9741 0.9508 0.9985
Cp
C-sector price markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.2266 0.0670 0.3786
Ip
I-sector price markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8034 0.6907 0.9269
w Wage markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.3246 0.1583 0.4917
&C C-sector equity capital Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8047 0.7609 0.8501
&I I-sector equity capital Beta 0.60 0.20 0.6070 0.4092 0.8002
K ;C C-sector valuation Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9142 0.8719 0.9570
K ;I I-sector valuation Beta 0.60 0.20 0.1943 0.0767 0.3050
Shocks:
Volatilities
z C-sector TFP Inv Gamma 0.50 2.0 0.2691 0.1628 0.3744
v I-sector TFP Inv Gamma 0.50 2.0 1.4572 1.2343 1.6774
b Preference Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 2.0948 1.3957 2.7869
e GDP measurement error Inv Gamma 0.50 2.0 0.4310 0.3649 0.4934
mp Monetary policy Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.1293 0.1114 0.1473
Cp
C-sector price markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.2797 0.2298 0.3290
Ip
I-sector price markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.2120 0.1547 0.2686
w Wage markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.3268 0.2582 0.3944
&C C-sector equity capital Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.2744 0.2225 0.3245
&I I-sector equity capital Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.1772 0.1105 0.2436
K ;C C-sector valuation Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.0558 0.0250 0.0863
2
K;4;C
C-sector valuation 4Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
p
2 2.0 0.0521 0.0186 0.0889
2
K;8;C
C-sector valuation 8Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
p
2 2.0 0.1709 0.0951 0.2459
K ;I I-sector valuation Inv Gamma 0.10 2.0 2.6620 2.1124 3.2142
2
K;4;I
I-sector valuation 4Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
p
2 2.0 0.0632 0.0165 0.1229
2
K;8;I
I-sector valuation 8Q ahead Inv Gamma 0.1/
p
2 2.0 0.0548 0.0175 0.1004
The parameter that captures the intratemporal adj. cost for investment, is a transformation of the original parameter, ,
according to,  = 1 + 1

.
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PI;t
PC;t
=
At
Vt
In this case the model has a one sector representation (e.g. Greenwood et al. (2000)) and
the ratio (At
Vt
) 1 defines the investment specific technology shock widely used in one sector
models. Thus, under assumptions (i)-(iii), one can identify the investment specific technology
shock from the relative price of investment alone. But as demonstrated, this tight restriction,
is not necessarily valid in a more elaborate two sector model with an imperfectly competitive
investment sector and limited capital mobility across sectors, like ours. In the more general
framework we consider, the relative price of investment reflects not only investment specific
shocks but also other shocks, such as time varying mark-up shocks. Therefore, investment
specific shocks in our model, despite the fact that we also include the relative price of invest-
ment in the estimation (through the inclusion of the sectoral inflation rates) are in principle
allowed to affect dynamics in a way that is consistent with volatilities and the spectrum of au-
tocorrelations and cross correlations in the entire set of observables, not just the relative price
of investment. From a quantitative perspective it is interesting to note our results on the im-
portance of investment sector TFP shocks are more in line with Fisher (2006)), who, using an
SVAR methodology, has argued for the significance of investment specific shocks of this type
in accounting for fluctuations.
The preference shock accounts for about 45% in the variance of consumption growth. This
is line with Justiniano et al. (2010) who also report evidence for the otherwise irrelevant pref-
erence shock in accounting for consumption fluctuations. Financial shocks account for a small
fraction of the variance in consumption growth, about 7-8%. The price mark-up shock in the
investment sector accounts for a sizable fraction in total investment and hours fluctuations, ap-
proximately 25% of the forecast error variance in each of these variables. Both price mark
up shocks explain to a large extent variation in the sectoral inflation rates, whereas the wage
mark-up shock primarily explains a large share of the variance in real wage growth (67%) and
to a smaller extent variance in hours worked (13%).
Turning to financial variables, the main driving forces for the consumption sector corporate
bond spread are both the valuation and equity capital shocks (for the consumption sector). The
eight quarter ahead news component and the equity capital shock, each roughly account for
about 35% in its variation. Thus a sizable component of the variance in consumption sector
spread can be explained by valuation news. This result suggests there is a significant amount
of advance information present in the spread series. By contrast only a small fraction of the
variation in the investment sector spread is explained by news shocks. The investment sector
TFP shock is the most important shock in explaining the variation in that spread series. Finally,
valuation news components account for about 15% in the nominal interest rate. This suggests
monetary policy responds to advance signals relating to the quality of banking sector balance
sheets, perhaps due to the imminent lending contraction that accompanies a decline in the
valuation of assets.
Table 6 presents an unconditional variance decomposition of the data to examine the low
frequency impact of shocks. In line with our findings above, this Table also shows the important
role of valuation news (four and eight quarter ahead) in accounting for the variance in output
(25%), investment (23%) and hours worked (27%). Valuation news together with equity capital
shocks account for about 73.5% in the variance of the consumption sector spread and over
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40% in the variance of the growth in equity capital. TFP shocks of the investment specific
type account for approximately 14%, 37%, 25% in output, investment and hours worked and
approximately 31% and 26% in the variance of the investment sector spread and equity capital
growth. In the Appendix we compute a variance decomposition implied at the prior means.
Table 10 reports the details. Comparing the variance decompositions implied by the posterior
estimates with the prior decomposition Table, clearly highlights the shift in the sources of
fluctuations implied by our estimates.
The quantitative results on the role of financial shocks have similarities with findings re-
ported in Gilchrist et al. (2009) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011), obtained using different
methodologies. Gilchrist et al. (2009) report that credit market shocks identified through cor-
porate credit spreads in a factor based VAR, explain around 30% of the variation in economic
activity (measured from industrial production), quite similar to the share explained by valua-
tion shocks in this paper. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011), decompose the movements in credit
spreads to default risk and an excess bond premium and find that the latter can explain around
10% and 25% of output and investment variation respectively, again quite similar to the vari-
ance shares in the same variables accounted for by valuation shocks.
We undertake an additional exercise to better appreciate the role of financial and valuation
news shocks in explaining the in-sample variation in the data. Figure 2, shows the sample
path of output growth, investment growth, total hours worked and credit spreads along with
simulation paths generated by the model when either only all financial shocks or all valuation
news shocks are turned on. A first visual inspection of Figure 2 illustrates that paths simulated
with financial shocks and to a large extent valuation news shocks turned on only, track the
patterns of the actual data shown quite closely. A noteworthy finding is that the path generated
with valuation news only correctly captures most of the turning points in actual output growth
while they also quite successfully account for the 2001 and 2008 recessions. Interestingly, the
extent of the decline in output during the 2008 recession can be entirely captured by the path
generated by valuation news. They also closely track GDP growth during the 2001 recession,
though they do not account very well for the 1990s recession. Further, the valuation news model
path tracks quite well the behavior of total hours worked. The simulated path captures the rise
after the 1990s recession, and the significant declines in the 2001 and the 2008 recessions. The
simulation path with financial shocks (fourth row, left panel) closely tracks the actual path of the
consumption sector spread. The path with valuation news only (right panel), correctly predicts
the rise of spreads in the 2001 and 2008 recession, but misses the 1990s recession. The path
with financial shocks (fifth row), captures to some extent the investment sector spread sample
path though not very successfully. The reason for this limited success of financial shocks is
that TFP shocks of the investment specific type account for a large share of the variance in this
spread.
Figure 3 presents the sample paths of (actual) sectoral hours worked along with the simula-
tion paths from the model with either financial or valuation news shocks turned on only. Note,
that sectoral hours worked have not been used as observables in the estimation, hence even
a simulation with all shocks active would not be able to perfectly fit the actual sample paths.
An interesting observation is the success of the simulation path generated by valuation news
in tracking the observed investment sector hours series despite the fact the estimation routine
has only used information from total hours. This counterfactual path accounts for the decline
in the 1990s as well as the prolonged decline well after the end of that recession. It can also
account quite successfully for the decline in the 2001 recession and the continued weakness in
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the aftermath of the recession—though it predicts a much stronger than actual recovery in the
mid part of the 2000s. Finally it accounts for the massive decline in investment sector hours in
the 2008 recession. It is also interesting to note that the counterfactual path not only correctly
predicts the direction of the change but gets the magnitude of the declines about right both in
the 2001 and the 2008 recessions (i.e. the peak to trough declines). The counterfactual paths
however do not track well the actual path of consumption sector hours. Essentially these sim-
ulation paths miss the robust growth in consumption sector hours for much of the 1990s and
until the 2001 recession, though they better capture the movements in this series in the second
half of the sample. Additional information about the model’s fit on the labor market dimension
is provided in Appendix D, Table 9.
In summary, both the the cyclical frequency and unconditional variance decompositions
reveal an important role for consumption sector valuation shocks. They are one of the main
driving forces for fluctuations in several macroeconomic variables including output growth,
investment growth and hours worked. They also explain a large share of the variance in the
financial variables of the model. TFP shocks of the investment specific type are also of consid-
erable importance in explaining the variance of real and financial variables. The contribution of
monetary policy shocks is limited, below 10% except for consumption growth and the nominal
interest rate. Last, we find a very limited contribution of the shocks to bank’s equity capital
except in accounting for the variance in equity growth and the two credit spread series.
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Figure 2: Data (solid line) and counterfactual simulation (thin line) with all financial shocks only
(left) or valuation news shocks only (right). From top to bottom row: Output growth, investment
growth, total hours, consumption sector credit spread, investment sector credit spread. consumption
sector hours, investment sector hours. Dashed lines in the figures for sectoral hours (rows 4 and 5)
depicts simulation for sectoral hours with all shocks activated.
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Table 5: Variance decomposition at different horizons
Financial Shocks
z v b e em 
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Period t=1:
Output Growth 8.81 0.00 2.64 28.86 11.16 5.28 5.92 6.75 2.75 0.01 2.35 0.15 1.51 23.80 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 6.88 0.95 54.61 0.08 17.06 8.74 0.00 7.15 0.05 0.00 0.81 1.14 0.27 2.27 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 1.23 37.75 2.29 0.06 3.50 0.02 22.02 3.76 3.35 0.01 1.69 0.80 1.29 22.22 0.00 0.00
Total Hours 0.24 0.76 4.62 0.14 14.52 1.57 20.36 10.53 3.46 0.01 2.24 12.07 1.80 27.67 0.00 0.00
Real Wage Growth 0.56 0.05 0.33 0.00 0.33 21.90 0.33 75.85 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.50 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 0.22 1.78 2.30 0.01 2.16 87.50 0.40 4.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 1.45 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Inflation 0.00 6.56 0.04 0.04 4.39 0.14 51.02 3.38 0.40 0.00 0.65 18.26 0.63 14.48 0.00 0.00
Nom. Interest Rate 0.11 0.43 1.32 0.45 64.93 29.26 0.52 0.78 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.09 1.96 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Spread 0.88 1.36 0.87 0.02 5.49 4.51 1.35 0.98 64.19 0.00 1.40 0.35 0.97 17.62 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Spread 2.34 3.00 1.81 0.08 26.21 13.77 2.97 2.41 0.71 39.21 0.00 7.29 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.01
Equity Growth 7.28 27.48 2.81 0.08 5.17 3.64 0.00 1.87 8.07 0.04 3.96 7.50 1.88 30.22 0.00 0.00
Period t=4:
Output Growth 7.02 14.49 1.91 17.54 9.06 3.59 9.64 7.30 2.03 0.01 2.05 0.78 1.41 23.18 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 9.17 0.84 48.97 0.08 15.81 8.69 0.02 10.03 0.08 0.00 1.17 1.53 0.39 3.21 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 0.89 43.35 1.78 0.04 2.57 0.04 24.64 3.28 2.11 0.01 1.13 2.24 0.95 16.95 0.00 0.00
Total Hours 0.50 12.57 2.22 0.11 10.90 1.23 28.42 11.87 1.69 0.00 1.55 2.00 1.59 25.36 0.00 0.00
Real Wage Growth 2.49 7.97 0.33 0.00 0.48 18.77 0.86 67.48 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.11 0.08 1.21 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 0.29 6.42 6.41 0.03 6.60 66.83 1.17 7.54 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.11 4.47 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Inflation 0.05 17.57 0.25 0.06 7.03 0.18 31.12 2.79 0.34 0.00 0.81 16.93 0.86 22.00 0.00 0.00
Nom. Interest Rate 0.14 2.99 6.88 0.29 40.90 30.39 3.27 4.18 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.29 0.36 10.05 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Spread 0.86 1.17 0.49 0.01 3.14 4.75 4.85 0.50 50.55 0.00 1.65 1.36 1.41 29.26 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Spread 3.05 12.92 1.17 0.05 22.06 19.66 5.47 1.56 0.81 26.16 0.00 6.87 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.02
Equity Growth 7.03 26.16 2.74 0.08 4.98 3.58 0.15 1.84 10.49 0.08 3.86 7.25 1.85 29.90 0.00 0.00
Period t=8:
Output Growth 6.68 14.90 2.42 16.61 9.26 3.57 9.76 7.18 2.54 0.01 2.05 1.13 1.43 22.45 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 8.32 0.98 49.48 0.07 15.07 9.16 0.35 9.00 0.08 0.00 1.16 1.53 0.44 4.35 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 0.90 41.48 1.73 0.04 2.62 0.13 24.82 3.30 2.68 0.01 1.32 2.49 1.09 17.39 0.00 0.00
Total Hours 0.68 18.38 1.25 0.09 8.45 1.08 29.42 12.24 0.89 0.00 1.02 1.13 1.16 24.20 0.00 0.00
Real Wage Growth 2.45 7.64 0.41 0.00 0.45 18.24 0.95 67.82 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.10 1.49 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 0.26 8.16 6.97 0.03 7.97 63.10 1.24 6.94 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.10 5.04 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Inflation 0.06 19.73 0.66 0.06 7.12 0.18 30.97 2.52 0.61 0.00 0.77 15.28 0.81 21.23 0.00 0.00
Nom. Interest Rate 0.12 11.24 11.87 0.20 27.01 20.29 5.28 5.95 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.74 0.42 16.64 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Spread 0.85 3.50 0.50 0.01 2.42 3.71 6.38 0.45 41.20 0.00 1.51 2.46 1.40 35.60 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Spread 3.34 25.67 2.12 0.05 16.87 15.23 6.45 2.29 0.63 19.73 0.02 6.64 0.04 0.87 0.01 0.02
Equity Growth 6.95 25.66 2.69 0.08 4.91 3.53 0.31 1.81 10.75 0.08 3.82 7.26 1.85 30.30 0.00 0.00
Period t=12:
Output Growth 6.38 14.14 2.36 15.69 9.25 3.45 10.94 7.48 2.53 0.01 2.04 1.11 1.44 23.19 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 7.73 1.85 48.27 0.07 14.50 8.91 0.72 8.91 0.08 0.00 1.09 1.55 0.45 5.85 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 0.87 38.14 1.65 0.04 2.55 0.12 26.34 3.36 2.54 0.01 1.33 2.47 1.13 19.45 0.00 0.00
Total Hours 0.71 21.55 1.11 0.08 7.86 1.08 28.39 12.48 0.90 0.00 0.90 1.09 1.02 22.81 0.00 0.00
Real Wage Growth 2.44 7.71 0.46 0.00 0.46 18.18 0.95 67.61 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.25 0.10 1.60 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 0.26 8.61 6.88 0.03 8.12 62.37 1.25 6.93 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.12 5.19 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Inflation 0.08 19.12 0.84 0.06 6.88 0.17 30.24 2.44 0.80 0.00 0.88 14.87 0.91 22.68 0.00 0.00
Nom. Interest Rate 0.11 17.16 13.60 0.17 22.56 16.92 5.09 6.09 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.87 0.36 16.75 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Spread 0.86 4.85 0.67 0.01 2.45 3.96 6.23 0.52 39.40 0.00 1.45 2.74 1.35 35.50 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Spread 3.38 30.24 2.35 0.06 15.37 14.18 5.90 2.21 0.60 17.01 0.03 6.77 0.06 1.81 0.01 0.02
Equity Growth 6.95 25.55 2.68 0.08 4.95 3.61 0.32 1.80 10.71 0.08 3.81 7.29 1.85 30.33 0.00 0.00
Period t=20:
Output Growth 6.27 13.85 2.32 15.36 9.17 3.40 11.36 7.67 2.49 0.01 2.01 1.18 1.43 23.49 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 7.42 3.81 46.59 0.07 13.99 8.57 0.83 9.03 0.11 0.00 1.06 1.57 0.44 6.53 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 0.86 36.99 1.64 0.04 2.50 0.13 26.76 3.34 2.48 0.01 1.30 2.70 1.11 20.13 0.00 0.00
Total Hours 0.68 24.04 1.11 0.08 7.38 1.03 26.75 11.94 0.98 0.00 0.97 1.13 1.04 22.88 0.00 0.00
Real Wage Growth 2.43 7.97 0.47 0.00 0.48 18.12 0.99 67.31 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.26 0.10 1.63 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 0.26 8.76 6.78 0.03 7.98 61.09 1.36 6.86 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.16 6.39 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Inflation 0.10 18.72 0.88 0.06 6.67 0.22 29.01 2.34 0.79 0.00 0.94 14.32 0.96 24.98 0.00 0.00
Nom. Interest Rate 0.10 23.43 13.62 0.15 19.89 15.01 4.62 5.76 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.81 0.40 15.64 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Spread 0.84 5.28 0.71 0.01 2.46 4.15 6.91 0.53 37.40 0.00 1.47 2.66 1.38 36.19 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Spread 3.47 31.68 2.20 0.06 15.15 14.23 5.51 2.04 0.62 15.54 0.03 7.32 0.06 2.06 0.01 0.02
Equity Growth 6.93 25.46 2.67 0.08 5.00 3.69 0.44 1.79 10.69 0.08 3.79 7.26 1.84 30.28 0.00 0.00
Period t=32:
Output Growth 6.26 13.91 2.33 15.35 9.15 3.40 11.34 7.67 2.49 0.01 2.01 1.19 1.42 23.46 0.00 0.00
Consumption Growth 7.26 5.22 45.59 0.07 13.68 8.39 0.87 8.89 0.12 0.00 1.09 1.55 0.45 6.84 0.00 0.00
Total Investment Growth 0.86 36.95 1.65 0.04 2.49 0.13 26.74 3.34 2.48 0.01 1.30 2.75 1.11 20.14 0.00 0.00
Total Hours 0.63 24.68 1.05 0.07 6.91 0.96 25.45 11.18 0.93 0.00 1.04 1.49 1.08 24.52 0.00 0.00
Real Wage Growth 2.42 8.24 0.47 0.00 0.48 18.05 1.02 67.04 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.26 0.10 1.68 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Inflation 0.26 8.85 6.71 0.03 7.89 60.40 1.40 6.79 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.18 7.08 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Inflation 0.10 18.63 0.88 0.06 6.63 0.24 28.95 2.33 0.81 0.00 0.94 14.38 0.96 25.09 0.00 0.00
Nom. Interest Rate 0.09 25.77 12.32 0.14 17.77 13.41 4.57 5.20 0.22 0.00 0.56 0.99 0.55 18.41 0.00 0.00
C-Sector Spread 0.79 5.02 0.66 0.01 2.33 3.94 7.32 0.49 35.08 0.00 1.47 2.90 1.41 38.57 0.00 0.00
I-Sector Spread 3.49 31.31 2.35 0.06 15.10 14.16 5.73 2.06 0.62 15.17 0.03 7.67 0.06 2.13 0.01 0.02
Equity Growth 6.90 25.51 2.67 0.08 4.99 3.69 0.51 1.79 10.66 0.08 3.77 7.23 1.83 30.28 0.00 0.00
z = TFP in consumption sector, v = TFP in investment sector, b = Preference shock, e = GDP measurement error, em = Monetary policy, Cp = Consumption sector
price markup, Ip = Investment sector price markup, w = Wage markup, &C = Consumption sector equity capital shocks, &I = Investment sector equity capital
shock, K;0C = Unanticipated consumption sector valuation, 
K;x
C = x quarter ahead anticipated consumption sector valuation, 
K;0
I = Unanticipated investment
sector valuation, K;xI = x quarters ahead valuation investment sector.
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Figure 3: Data (solid line) and counterfactual simulation (thin line) with all financial shocks only
(left) or valuation news shocks only (right). Dashed lines in the figures for sectoral hours depicts
simulation for sectoral hours with all shocks activated. From top to bottom row: consumption sector
hours, investment sector hours.
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7 The Propagation of Valuation Shocks
The variance decompositions above suggest valuation shocks are significant in accounting for
the dynamics of the macroeconomic aggregates and financial variables. In this section, we
discuss the model’s responses to these type of shocks through a series of impulse response
functions (IRFs). We attempt to understand the reasons for their important role in accounting
for fluctuations. We examine both news and unanticipated valuation shocks.
Anticipated Shocks. We discuss the model’s responses to an eight quarter ahead valuation
shock. Figure 4 shows the responses to a signal of a future (two year ahead) decline in the value
of assets of banks portfolios in the consumption sector.17 The value of assets (held in the bank’s
portfolios) decline on impact upon arrival of bad news. This initial decline in the value of assets
leads to de-leveraging by the financial sector: banks use equity capital to cover losses on assets
held (to satisfy their balance sheet constraint), while at the same time reducing demand for new
assets. The initial depressing effect on the value of assets can be readily illustrated with the
equation that defines the value of capital in the consumption sector,
Qc;t = Et
t+1
t
Kc;t+1
 
RKc;t+1
Pc;t+1
uc;t+1 +Qc;t+1(1  c)  a(uc;t+1)At+1V
ac 1
1 ai
t+1
!
;
Given the forward looking behavior of Qc;t the equation above shows that news about the
future path of Kc;t, affects the value of capital today. Banks deleverage relatively quickly: while
leverage initially rises due to the big impact of the decline in equity capital, it falls below the
steady state within four quarters. Recapitalization of banks with equity develops quickly; when
the shock actually materializes banks have more equity capital compared with assets so their
leverage ratio is smaller than what they begun with. In this sense, banks prepare for the antici-
pated decline in asset values ahead of time with a significant reduction in asset demand. Credit
spreads in the consumption sector rise in anticipation of the deterioration in asset quality, con-
sistent with the countercyclical behavior of risk premia in the data. This type of financial shock
spills over to the investment sector through lower demand for capital goods. Lower demand
for consumption sector assets by intermediaries leads to a reduction in the demand for capital
(by capital services producers from physical producers) which in turn leads to an an overall
reduction in the production of investment goods, including investment goods produced for the
investment sector. The reduction in the demand for investment goods leads to a decline in their
relative price. This can be seen by noting that the growth in the relative price of investment is
equal to the sectoral inflation differential (i.e. investment minus consumption sector inflation).
The reduction in investment demand leads to a lower volume of financing for investment sector
capital goods and consequently lower valuation of these assets. The interesting aspect of the
IRFs, especially in relation to hours worked, is the prediction of a relatively strong decline in
investment sector in relation to consumption sector hours. In addition, the behavior of total
hours mirrors the behavior of investment sector hours. Thus the model is able to successfully
replicate the sectoral facts about hours worked discussed in the introduction. Its important to
note, that the bulk of the adverse effects felt in the investment sector from the bad valuation
17All shocks in this section are set to produce a downturn.
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news in the consumption sector are due to the real link between the two sectors, i.e. the reduc-
tion in demand for capital goods from the consumption sector. Figure 5 attempts to isolate this
channel. It shows IRFs from the benchmark model and compares them with IRFs from a model
where financial intermediation is turned off in the investment sector only. The IRFs from the
two models are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. The only material difference arises
with respect to investment goods produced for the investment sector; in the benchmark model
the decline in production is more pronounced and it takes longer for investment in that sector to
recover. The anticipation of the decline in the valuation of assets also triggers a negative wealth
effect that reduces consumption. The negative effect on consumption and investment leads to
a strong initial decline in output before the shock to valuation materializes. One noteworthy
aspect of the adjustment to the valuation news disturbance is the fact the contractionary phase
is quite long and recovery is slow. In comparison to the unanticipated shock IRFs (shown be-
low), the combination of news and subsequent movements in fundamentals lead to a deeper
and longer recession phase. The arrival of bad news itself generate significant declines in the
various macroeconomic aggregates. However, the actual realization of the bad news sets off
an extended phase of reduced financing, depressed asset values and economic activity. This is
quite noticeable from Figure 4. Financial claims, i.e. volume of financing, declines further at
the time when the shock materializes and remains depressed for an extended period of time.
The broad macroeconomic aggregates, namely, output, consumption, investment and hours
worked exhibit co-movement in response to the valuation news shock. Output, consumption,
investment and hours worked fall instantly in response to the signal that valuation of consump-
tion sector assets will deteriorate in the future. Importantly, the IRFs illustrate that this type
of news shock can generate the pattern of sectoral co-movement that is a distinctive feature of
the business cycle. Both sectoral hours and sectoral investment rates experience a decline in
response to the unfavorable valuation news shock.
Unanticipated Shocks. Figure 6 shows the economy’s response to a one standard deviation
unanticipated valuation shock. The effects are quite similar as those for the news shock. The
initial exogenous decline in the valuation of assets in the consumption sector leads to an in-
crease in the leverage ratio. The increase in the leverage ratio reflects the destruction in banks
equity capital to cover the asset losses. This triggers an endogenous reaction that causes an even
more substantial deterioration of asset values in this sector: Owing to the presence of leverage
ratio constraints, banks have to sell assets which puts downward pressure on the market price
of capital, QC . Financial intermediaries strengthen their balance sheets by demanding a higher
return,RBC , which leads in a sharp increase of the credit spread. As a result, consumption sector
investment drops substantially which makes the contraction spread to the real economy.
Lower demand for investment goods from the consumption sector dampens production in
the investment sector and the price per effective unit of capital (QI) drops. This drop has a sim-
ilar effect on this sector’s credit spread and leverage ratio as just described for the consumption
sector above. However, the contraction in the investment sector is less strong since the valu-
ation of investment sector capital does not decline. As explained above, the downturn in this
sector is triggered by the endogenous link between the two sectors, through lower demand for
capital.
Inspecting the mechanism. The discussion of the impulse response functions illustrates that
valuation shocks of the anticipated type generate the broad based aggregate and sectoral co-
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Figure 4: Responses to a negative valuation news shock (anticipated 8 quarters ahead) in the con-
sumption sector.
movement observed in the data. In this section we investigate in more detail the reasons why
these shocks turn out to be important. Specifically, we study the IRFs from a model with and a
model without frictions in financial intermediation. In both models we use identical parameter
values as estimated in Table 4.
Figure 7 shows impulse responses to a valuation news shock for the model with (solid line)
and without financial frictions (dotted line). It is evident that the model without financial fric-
tions cannot generate aggregate or sectoral comovement. In that model, output, investment and
total hours worked respond positively to this unfavorable shock. Both sectoral investment vari-
ables rise in response while investment sector hours rise and consumption sector hours fall in
response to the same shock. The reason for the radically different responses is that in the model
without financial frictions the valuation shock acts as a negative supply shock, i.e. reducing the
productivity of capital services production. Agents attempt to protect from the future deteriora-
tion in the productivity of capital services by building more capital now via higher investment.
Given the immobility of capital between sectors, this is the only feasible way to change the
effective quantity of capital across sectors. Hours can change swiftly across sectors, thus to
boost capital production the household reallocates hours from the consumption to the invest-
ment sector. Figure 7 shows that financial frictions strongly amplify the economy’s response to
the valuation news shock, through its impact of the leverage constraint that restricts the amount
of credit in the real economy. In the model with frictionless financial intermediation this shock
does not have any implications for bank’s ability to intermediate funds. Thus investment spend-
ing can be swiftly financed in order to cover the expected deterioration in the productivity of
capital services. The increase in investment and the negative wealth effect due to bad news
about capital productivity crowds out consumption.
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Figure 5: Responses to a negative valuation news shock (anticipated 8 quarters ahead) in the con-
sumption sector. Benchmark model (solid lines) vs. Model without financial intermediation in the
investment sector (dotted lines).
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Figure 6: Responses to a negative unanticipated valuation shock in the consumption sector.
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Figure 7: Responses to a negative valuation news shock (anticipated 8 quarters ahead) in the con-
sumption sector. Model with (solid line) and without (dashed line) financial frictions.
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8 Interpreting Valuation Shocks
The exercise above indicates that the frictions in financial intermediation is a key mechanism
that enables the valuation shock to play an important role in aggregate fluctuations. In this
section we undertake comparisons of the estimated valuations shocks from the model with two
widely used financial market indicators.
Valuation shocks and lending indicators. We compare the estimated valuations shocks
from the model (news and unanticipated) to an observable indicator that captures banking sec-
tor lending practices. Specifically, we use the Federal Reserve Board’s Loan Officer Opinion
Survey (LOOS) that asks senior management from big US banks the following question:
Over the past three months, how have your bank credit standards for approving loan appli-
cations for Commercial and Industrial loans or credit lines–excluding those to finance mergers
and acquisitions–changed? 1. Tightened considerably, 2. tightened somewhat, 3. remained
basically unchanged, 4. eased somewhat, 5. eased considerably
The survey reports the net percent balance of banks reporting that lending standards for
commercial and industrial loans have tightened (number of loan officers reporting tightening
less the number reporting easing divided by the total number); responses account for around
60% of all US bank loans and around 70% of all US business loans. The lending standards
index is a qualitative indicator of credit tightness. In Figure 8, we plot the net balance from the
survey against the inverse of unanticipated (left panel) and eight quarter ahead valuation news
shock (right panel).18 The correlation of the lending standards index over the entire sample is
0.41 and 0.38 for the unanticipated and news valuation respectively and is significant at the 1%
level. The Figure also shows that the estimated shocks track the lending standards indicator
much better in the second half of the sample. A notable feature in Figure 8 is the fact that
both lending standards and unfavorable news about valuations rise sharply before and during
recessions. In both the early 2001 and the 2007-2008 recessions the estimated series gives
advance signals of declines in the valuations of assets held by intermediaries and as explained in
Section 7 generate reductions in the supply of credit. Interestingly, Lown and Morgan (2006),
using a VARmethodology find that innovations to LOOS lending standards predict contractions
in loans and output.19
Valuation shocks and default indicators. We compare the estimated eight quarter ahead
valuation news shock with an indicator of default risk of the non-financial corporate sector
available from Fitch. Figure 9 plots the estimated (inverse) of valuation news shocks series
against the Fitch 5-year ahead probability of default available from 2001. In Appendix E,
Figure 11, we compare the shock series with the Fitch 1-year ahead probability.20 The default
probability is a forward looking measure of default risk, providing advance information of
18To facilitate comparison with each shock series the lending standards index is normalized to have a zero mean
and the same standard deviation as each of the shock series.
19Bassett et al. (2010) identify loan supply shocks using detailed information on the reasons reported by loan
officers for changes in lending standards; they show among the most important ones for changing standards are
perceptions of future economic outlook, suggesting that the LOOS reflects to some degree anticipated macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, and risk tolerance.
20To facilitate comparison with the shock series the default risk indicator is normalized to have a zero mean and
the same standard deviation as the shock series.
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Figure 8: Contemporaneous valuation shock (thin line, left figure), eight quarter ahead valuation
shock (thin line, right figure) and Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
by the Federal Reserve Board (thick line).
changes in the credit quality of bond issuing firms. The estimated valuation news series is
strongly correlated with both the 1 and the 5 year ahead measure, though more so with the latter.
Figure 9 indicates the valuation news series captures the rise in the probability of default both in
the 2001 and the 2008 recessions. Interestingly, our shock series begins to signal unfavorable
news at the same time when the probability of default measure begins to pick up in the mid
2007. The close association between our shock series and the market probability of default
measure strongly indicates the close association of the valuation shock with default risk and
supports its interpretation as a financial shock.
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Figure 9: Valuation news (8 quarter ahead) shock (thin line) and Fitch five-year ahead probability
of default measure (thick line). A positive value for the valuation shock series indicates unfavorable
news.
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9 Model Fit Comparisons
This section presents a comparison of different model versions. We aim to assess the fit of
the benchmark model in relation to alternatives, without financial intermediation, without news
shocks or with news shocks in both TFP and valuation processes. Table 7 reports all the differ-
ent specifications we have considered. The top panel reports the marginal data densities com-
puted using the modified harmonic mean estimator suggested by Geweke (1999). The bench-
mark model with four and eight quarters ahead anticipated valuation components dominates—
in terms of this metric—specifications that include TFP news only (model B and C) or both
TFP and valuation news (model D and E). It dominates model versions with signals that arrive
more frequently. It also dominates the model with unanticipated shocks only (model F). Last,
we also compare the fit of the benchmark model to a model with financial frictions turned off.
This comparison is reported in the bottom panel of the Table. To facilitate the comparison
we estimate these versions on a restricted set of data, namely, excluding both corporate bond
spreads and equity as the model without financial frictions makes no predictions for financial
variables. The benchmark model with valuation shocks (four and eight quarter ahead valuation
news and unanticipated) dominates this frictionless model on the restricted set of observables,
highlighting the importance of financial frictions in fitting the data. Last, we highlight the fact
that the presence of financial variables in the estimation significantly raises the contribution of
valuation news shocks in accounting for the variance in the data. When we estimate the model
with the restricted set of data (model version G), the unconditional variance shares of valu-
ation news shocks decline significantly compared to the benchmark model with the financial
series used in estimation. Specifically, in model version G, valuation news account for 13.40%,
10.60%, 12.60% of the forecast error variance in output growth, investment growth and hours
worked respectively. By contrast, in the benchmark model, they account for approximately,
25%, 21.30% and 26.50% of the variance in the same variables, thus approximately doubling
in importance.
Table 7: Log marginal data densities for different model setups
Model Setup Log Marginal
Data Density
Estimated with full data set
Benchmark 4 and 8 quarter ahead valuation news shocks in both sectors -761.15
Model A: 1, 4 and 8 quarter ahead valuation news shocks in both sectors -763.00
Model B: 4 and 8 quarter ahead TFP news shocks in both sectors -778.00
Model C: 1, 4 and 8 quarter ahead TFP news shocks in both sectors -778.00
Model D: 4 and 8 quarter ahead valuation news shocks and TFP news in both sectors -770.24
Model E: 1, 4 and 8 quarter ahead valuation news shocks and TFP news in both sectors -772.90
Model F: Model without any anticipated components -771.74
Estimated with restricted data set
Model G: Benchmark estimated without spread and equity data as observables -532.54
Model H: Model with frictionless financial intermediation estimated without spread and equity data as observables
-533.70
37
10 A Historical Perspective and the 2008 Recession
Given the quantitative importance of news shocks as driving forces, we attempt to disentan-
gle the impact of anticipated and unanticipated shocks on the in-sample variation of GDP and
investment by performing a historical decomposition. Figure 10 depicts the results of this exer-
cise. In this figure we show the combined effects of valuation news vs. all other unanticipated
shocks.
The historical decompositions show that news shocks were the main sources for the re-
cessions in 2001 (2001Q1 - 2001Q4) and 2008 (2007Q4 - 2009Q2). Valuation news shocks
contribute very little to the downturn of GDP and investment in the early 1990s (1990Q3 -
1991Q1) recession. This finding is in line with the general assessment of the reasons for these
recessions: while movements in fundamentals are mainly found to be responsible for the reces-
sion in the early 1990s (see for example Walsh (1993)), it is thought that expectation shifts may
have played a much bigger role in the last two recessions (see for example Christiano et al.
(2008)). These are thought by many to be the result of bursting bubbles due to a correction
of overoptimistic expectations. The historical decompositions are consistent with this view.
Notice that expectations about future valuations are revised downwards immediately at the be-
ginning of the two recessions and explain a substantial fraction of both downturns. The finding
that news shocks are mainly responsible for these two recessions is also consistent with work
of Beaudry and Portier (2004) who interpret Pigou cycles as a theory of recessions.
Anticipated shocks not only have a strong negative impact during the aforementioned reces-
sions, but also slow down the subsequent recoveries. This is especially clear in the aftermath of
the 2001 recession where we have a complete set of observations on the recovery and expansion
phase until the 2008 recession. A similar pattern can be observed after the recent recession, but
in this case a longer sample size would be desirable to be able to draw a more complete picture.
The slow reversion of anticipated shock’s impact on GDP and investment growth at the trough
of the cycle and the instant revision at the peak is consistent with the literature that finds agent’s
forecast accuracy to be positively correlated with output.21
11 Conclusions
In this paper we used Bayesian techniques to estimate a two-sector DSGE model for the US
economy using a sample from 1990Q2 to 2011Q1. The framework explicitly models financial
intermediation in the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2011) and includes two types of financial
shocks among other sources considered in the literature on business cycles. These shocks
are, first, a shock to the valuation of intermediary assets and second, an equity capital shock.
The former allows for variation in the price of capital and its propagation through financial
intermediation makes it especially prone to being a potential channel for anticipation effects.
We report several results. First, we find valuation shocks can explain a sizable fraction of
fluctuations at both business cycle and lower frequencies. They can account for approximately
25% of output growth, 20% of aggregate investment growth and 25% of aggregate hours vari-
ance. Interestingly, news about asset valuations (coined “valuation news”) that arrive up to 2
years in advance explain the majority of the variance shares above. Shocks of this type have
been examined qualitatively in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and
21See for example Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) and Görtz and Tsoukalas (2011a).
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Figure 10: Historical decomposition of the growth rate of GDP (top) and investment (bottom). The
grey bars denote recessions as announced by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.
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our paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first quantitative estimate of their impor-
tance. Our estimates moreover indicate that corporate bond market spreads contain substantial
information about valuation news shocks. Second, valuation news shocks can generate aggre-
gate and sectoral co-movement, a pervasive stylized fact of business cycles and can explain the
behavior of total hours worked surprisingly well during recessions. The success in explaining
the behavior of total hours during recessions is linked to the fact these shocks almost entirely
capture the declines in investment sector hours during these periods, in line with the evidence
presented in the introduction. Third, investment sector TFP shocks (or investment specific
shocks popularized by Greenwood et al. (2000) and Fisher (2006)) account for a relatively sig-
nificant fraction of business cycle variation in output growth, total investment growth and total
hours worked consistent with the findings in Fisher (2006). This stands in sharp contrast with
their negligible importance reported in several recent estimated one sector DSGE models such
as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) or Gilchrist et al. (2009). The primary reason for this find-
ing is the tight link imposed in estimation—between investment specific shocks and the relative
price of investment. As a result, in those studies, investment specific shocks are identified from
the relative price of investment alone. This constraint does not necessarily hold in a two sector
model, except under special assumptions. Last, from a historical perspective, valuation news
shocks can entirely explain the decline in GDP and a large fraction of the investment collapse
in the early stages of the 2008 recession. They are also found to be driving, to a significant ex-
tent, the declines in GDP and investment in the 2001 recession following the 1990s investment
boom. However they are estimated to have played a very limited role during the recession at
the beginning of the 1990s consistent with earlier work that found only limited credit supply
effects on the severity of the 1990-1991 recession (e.g. Bernanke et al. (1991)).
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12 Appendix
A Financial Intermediaries
This part of the appendix describes in detail how the setup of Gertler and Karadi (2011) is
adapted for the two sector model. It further outlines in detail how the equations for financial
intermediaries in the main part of this paper are derived.
The balance sheet of a financial intermediary for the consumption or investment sector can
be expressed as
Qx;tSx;t = Nx;t +
Bx;t
PC;t
; x = C; I;
where Sx;t denotes the quantity of financial claims on non-financial firms held by the inter-
mediary and Qx;t denotes the price of a claim in the consumption or investment sector. The
variable Nx;t represents the bank’s wealth at the end of period t and Bx;t are the deposits the
intermediary for the consumption or investment sector obtains from households.22 Banks inter-
mediate the demand and supply for equity from households to the producers in the two sectors.
Additionally, they engage in maturity transformation by holding long term assets of borrowers
which are funded with the bank’s own equity capital and lenders short term liabilities. The as-
sets held by the financial intermediary of sector x at time t pay in the next period the stochastic
return RBx;t+1 from borrowers in this sector. Intermediaries pay at t+ 1 the non-contingent real
gross returnRt to households for their deposits made at time t. Then, the intermediary’s wealth
evolves over time as
Nx;t+1 = R
B
x;t+1Qx;tSx;t  Rt
Bx;t
PC;t
= RBx;t+1Qx;tSx;t  Rt(Qx;tSx;t  Nx;t)
= (RBx;t+1  Rt)Qx;tSx;t +RtNx;t:
The premium, RBx;t+1   Rt, as well as the quantity of assets, Qx;tSx;t, determines the growth
in bank’s wealth above the riskless return. Therefore, the bank will not fund any assets with a
negative discounted premium. It follows that for the bank to operate in period i the following
inequality must hold
Et
iBt+1+i(R
B
x;t+1+i  Rt+i)  0; i  0;
where iBt+1+i is the bank’s stochastic discount factor, with
Bt+1 
t+1
t
;
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget equation. Under perfect capital
markets, arbitrage guarantees that the risk premium collapses to zero and the relation always
22The total quantity of bonds held by households, Bt, is the sum of bonds from the intermediaries of the two
sectors as well as the government
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holds with equality. However, under imperfect capital markets, credit constraints rooted in the
bank’s inability to obtain enough funds may lead to positive risk premia. As long as the above
inequality holds, banks for the investment and the consumption sector will keep building assets
by borrowing additional funds from households. Accordingly, the intermediaries in the two
sectors have the objective to maximize expected terminal wealth
Vx;t =maxEt
X
i=0
(1  B)iBiBt+1+iNx;t+1+i
=maxEt
X
i=0
(1  B)iBiBt+1+i[(RBx;t+1+i  Rt+i)Qx;t+iSpx;t+i +Rt+iNx;t+i]; (A.1)
where B 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of bankers at t that survive until period t+ 1.
Following the setup in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) the banks
are limited from infinitely borrowing additional funds from households by a moral hazard/costly
enforcement problem. On the one hand, the agent who works in the bank can choose at the be-
ginning of each period to divert the fraction B of available funds and transfer it back to the
household. On the other hand, depositors can force the bank into bankruptcy and recover a
fraction 1   B of assets.23 Note that the fraction, B, which intermediaries can divert is the
same across sectors to guarantee that the household is indifferent between lending funds to the
bank in the consumption and the investment sector.
Given this tradeoff, lenders will only supply funds to the financial intermediary when the
bank’s maximized expected terminal wealth is larger or equal to the bank’s gain from diverting
the fraction B of available funds. This incentive constraint can be formalized as
Vx;t  BQx;tSx;t; 0 < B < 1: (A.2)
Using equation (A.1), the expression for Vx;t can be written as the following first-order differ-
ence equation
Vx;t = x;tQx;tSx;t + x;tNx;t;
with
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1(RBx;t+1  Rt) + BZx1;t+1x;t+1g;
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1Rt + BZx2;t+1x;t+1g;
and
Zx1;t+1+i 
Qx;t+1+iSx;t+1+i
Qx;t+iSx;t+i
; Zx2;t+1+i 
Nx;t+1+i
Nx;t+i
:
The variable x;t can be interpreted in the following way: For an intermediary of sector
x it is the expected discounted marginal gain of expanding assets Qx;tSx;t by one unit while
holding wealth Nx;t constant. The interpretation of x;t is analogous: For an intermediary of
sector x it is the expected discounted value of having an additional unit of wealth,Nx;t, holding
the quantity of financial claims, Sx;t, constant. The gross growth rate in assets is denoted by
Zx1;t+i and the gross growth rate of net worth is denoted by Z
x
2;t+i.
23We follow the assumption in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) that it is too costly for the depositors to recover the
fraction B of funds.
46
Then, using the expression for Vx;t, we can express the bank’s incentive constraint (A.2) as
x;tQx;tSx;t + x;tNx;t  BQx;tSx;t:
As indicated above, under perfect capital markets banks will expand borrowing until the risk
premium collapses to zero which implies that in this case x;t equals zero as well. However, due
to the moral hazard/costly enforcement problem introduced above capital markets are imperfect
in this setup. Imperfect capital markets may limit the possibilities for this kind of arbitrage
because the intermediaries are constrained by their equity capital. If the incentive constraint
binds it follows that
Qx;tSx;t =
x;t
B   x;tNx;t
= %x;tNx;t: (A.3)
In this case the quantity of assets which the intermediary can acquire depends on the equity
capital, Nx;t, as well as the intermediary’s leverage ratio, %x;t. This leverage ratio is the ratio
of the bank’s intermediated assets to equity. The moral hazard/costly enforcement problem
constraints the bank’s ability to acquire assets because it introduces an endogenous capital con-
straint. By raising the leverage ratio through an increase in x;t, the bank’s incentive to divert
funds and the bank’s opportunity costs from being forced into bankruptcy by the depositors
increase. The bank’s leverage ratio is limited to the point where its maximized expected termi-
nal wealth equals the gains from diverting the fraction B from available funds. However, the
constraint (A.3) binds only if 0 < x;t < B (given Nx;t > 0). As described above, the case
x;t < 0 implies a negative interest rate premium leading the bank to stop operating. In case
interest rate premia are relatively high causing x;t to be larger than B, the value of operating
always exceeds the bank’s gain from diverting funds.
Using the leverage ratio (A.3) we can express the evolution of the intermediary’s wealth as
Nx;t+1 = [(R
B
x;t+1  Rt)%x;t +Rt]Nx;t:
From this equation it also follows that
Zx2;t+1 =
Nx;t+1
Nx;t
= (RBx;t+1  Rt)%x;t +Rt;
and
Zx1;t+1 =
Qx;t+1Sx;t+1
Qx;tSx;t
=
%x;t+1Nx;t+1
%x;tNx;t
=
%x;t+1
%x;t
Zx2;t+1:
Financial intermediaries which are forced into bankruptcy can be replaced by new entering
banks. Therefore, total wealth of financial intermediaries is the sum of the net worth of existing,
N ex;t, and new banks, N
n
x;t.
Nx;t = N
e
x;t +N
n
x;t:
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The fraction B of bankers at t  1 which survive until t is equal across sectors. Then, the law
of motion for existing bankers in sector x = C; I is given by
N ex;t =B[(R
B
x;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]Nx;t 1; 0 < B < 1: (A.4)
where a main source of fluctuations is the ex-post excess return on assets, RBx;t   Rt 1, which
increases in impact on N ex;t in the leverage ratio.
New entering banks receive startup funds from their respective household which are equal
to a small fraction of the value of assets held by the existing bankers in their final operating
period. Given that the exit probability is i.i.d., the value of assets held by the existing bankers
in their final operating period is given by (1  B)Qx;tSx;t. The respective household transfers
a fraction, $, of this value to the new intermediaries in the two sectors which leads to the
following formulation for new banker’s wealth
Nnx;t = $Qx;tSx;t; 0 < $ < 1: (A.5)
Existing banker’s net worth (A.4) and entering banker’s net worth (A.5) lead to the law of
motion for total net worth
Nx;t =
 
B[(R
B
x;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]Nx;t 1 +$Qx;tSx;t

&x;t;
where the variable &x;t is a shock to the bank’s equity capital. This shock evolves according to
log &x;t = &x log &x;t 1 + 
&
x;t; x = C; I
where &x 2 (0; 1) and &x;t is i:i:d N(0; 2&x).
The external finance premium for sectors x = C; I can be defined as
Rx;t = R
B
x;t+1  Rt:
Gertler and Karadi (2011) state that the financial structure with a one period bond allows inter-
preting the external finance premium as a credit spread.
Since Rt, B, $ and B are equal across sectors, the institutional setup of the two repre-
sentative banks in the two sectors is symmetric. Both banks hold bonds from households and
buy assets from firms in the respective sector. Their performance differs because the demand
for capital differs across sectors resulting in sector specific prices of capital, Qx;t, and nominal
rental rates for capital, RKx;t. Note that the institutional setup of banks does not depend on firm-
specific factors. Gertler and Karadi (2011) show that this implies that a setup with a continuum
of banks is equivalent to a formulation with a representative bank. Owing to the symmetry of
the banks this also holds for our formulation of financial intermediaries in the two-sector setup.
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B Stationary Economy
The model includes two non-stationary technology shocks, At and Vt. Therefore, the model
variables are normalized as follows24
kx;t =
Kx;t
V
1
1 ai
t
; kx;t =
Kx;t
V
1
1 ai
t
; kt =
Kt
V
1
1 ai
t
; (B.1)
ix;t =
Ix;t
V
1
1 ai
t
; it =
It
V
1
1 ai
t
; ct =
Ct
AtV
ac
1 ai
t
; (B.2)
rKC;t =
RKC;t
PC;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t ; r
K
I;t =
RKI;t
PC;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t ; wt =
Wt
PC;tAtV
ac
1 ai
t
: (B.3)
From
PI;t
PC;t
=
mcC;t
mcI;t
1  ac
1  ai
At
Vt
KI;t
LI;t
 aiKC;t
LC;t
ac
=
mcC;t
mcI;t
1  ac
1  aiAtV
ac 1
1 ai
t
 kI;t
LI;t
 ai kC;t
LC;t
ac
;
follows that
pi;t =
PI;t
PC;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t : (B.4)
and the multipliers are normalized as
t = tAtV
ac
1 ai
t ; t = tV
1
1 ai
t : (B.5)
Using the growth of investment, it follows from the equations of the price of capital that
qx;t = Qx;tA
 1
t V
1 ac
1 ai
t :
Using the growth of capital, it follows from the borrow in advance constraint that
sx;t =
Sx;t
V
1
1 ai
t
:
Then, it follows from entering bankers wealth equation (A.5) that
nnx;t = N
n
x;tA
 1
t V
 ac
1 ai
t :
Total wealth, wealth of existing and entering bankers has to grow at the same rate
nex;t = N
e
x;tA
 1
t V
 ac
1 ai
t ; nx;t = Nx;tA
 1
t V
 ac
1 ai
t :
24Lower case variables denote normalized stationary variables.
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B.1 Intermediate goods producers
Firm’s production function in the consumption sector:
ct = L
1 ac
C;t k
ac
C;t   FC : (B.6)
Firm’s production function in the investment sector:
it = L
1 ai
I;t k
ai
I;t   FI : (B.7)
Marginal costs in the consumption sector:
mcC;t = (1  ac)ac 1a acc (rKC;t)acw1 act : (B.8)
Marginal costs in the investment sector:
mcI;t = (1  ai)ai 1a aii w1 ait (rKI;t)aip 1i;t ; with pi;t =
PI;t
PC;t
: (B.9)
Capital labour ratios in the two sectors:
kC;t
LC;t
=
wt
rKC;t
ac
1  ac ;
kI;t
LI;t
=
wt
rKI;t
ai
1  ai : (B.10)
B.2 Firms’ pricing decisions
Price setting equation for firms that change their price in sector x = C; I:
0 = Et
( 1X
s=0
sp;x
st+s~xt+s
h
~px;t ~t;t+s   (1 + xp;t+s)mcx;t+s
i)
; (B.11)
with
~t;t+s =
sY
k=1
"x;t+k 1
x
pxx;t+k
x
 1#
and ~xt+s =
 ~Px;t
Px;t
~t;t+s
  1+xp;t+s
xp;t+s xt+s
and
~Px;t
Px;t
= ~px;t:
Aggregate price index in the consumption sector:
1 =
"
(1  x;p)(~px;t)
1
xp;t + x;p
hx;t 1
x
pxx;t
x
 1i 1
xp;t
#xp;t
:
It further holds that
I;t
C;t
=
pi;t
pi;t 1
: (B.12)
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B.3 Household’s optimality conditions and wage setting
Marginal utility of income:
t =
bt
ct   hct 1

At 1
At

Vt 1
Vt
 ac
1 ai
  h bt+1
ct+1

At+1
At

Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai   hct
: (B.13)
Euler equation:
t = Ett+1
 At
At+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 ac
1 aiRt
1
c;t+1
:
Optimal capital utilisation in both sectors:
rKC;t = a
0(uC;t); rKI;t = a
0(uI;t):
Optimal choice of available capital in sector x = C; I:
Cx;t = Et
K
x;t+1
(
t+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 1
1 ai (rKx;t+1ux;t+1   a(ux;t+1)) + (1  )Etx;t+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 1
1 ai
)
;
(B.14)
Optimal choice of investment in sector x = C; I:
[i I;t+i
 
C;t
  1

 1
i  1x;t tpi;t
=x;t
"
1  S
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai

  S 0
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai
#
+ Etx;t+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 1
1 ai
"
S 0
 ix;t+1
ix;t
Vt+1
Vt
 1
1 ai
ix;t+1
ix;t
Vt+1
Vt
 1
1 ai
2#
: (B.15)
Definition of capital input in both sectors:
kC;t = uC;t
K
C;t
kC;t 1
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai ; kI;t = uI;t
K
I;t
kI;t 1
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai : (B.16)
Accumulation of available capital in sector x = C; I:
kx;t = (1  x)Kx;tkx;t 1
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai +

1  S
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai

ix;t; (B.17)
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B.4 Household’s wage setting
Household’s wage setting:
Et
1X
s=0
sswt+s
~Lt+s
"
~wt ~
w
t;t+s   (1 + w;t+s)bt+s'
~Lt+s
t+s
#
= 0; (B.18)
with
~wt;t+s =
sY
k=1
" 
C;t+k 1e
at+k 1+ ac1 ai vt+k 1
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
!w 
C;t+ke
at+k+
ac
1 ai vt+k
Ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
! 1#
and
~Lt+s =
 ~wt ~wt;t+s
wt+s
  1+w;t+s
w;t+s Lt+s:
Wages evolve according to
wt =
(
(1  w) ~w
1
w;t
t + w
"c;t 1eat 1+ ac1 ai vt 1
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
lwc;teat+ ac1 ai vt
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
 1
wt 1
# 1
w;t
)w;t
:
B.5 Financial Intermediation
The stationary stochastic discount factor can be expressed as
Bt+1 =
t+1
t
:
Then, one can derive expressions for x;t and x;t
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1
At
At+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 ac
1 ai (RBx;t+1  Rt) + Bzx1;t+1x;t+1g;
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1
At
At+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 ac
1 aiRt + Bz
x
2;t+1x;t+1g;
with
zx1;t+1+i 
qx;t+1+isx;t+1+i
qx;t+isx;t+i
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai ; zx2;t+1+i 
nx;t+1+i
nx;t+i
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai :
It follows that if the bank’s incentive constraint binds it can be expressed as
x;tqx;tsx;t + x;tnx;t = Bqx;tsx;t
,qx;tsx;t = %x;tnx;t;
with the leverage ratio given as
%x;t =
x;t
B   x;t :
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It further follows that:
zx2;t+1 =
nx;t+1
nx;t
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai = (RBx;t+1  Rt)%x;t +Rt;
and
zx1;t+1 =
qx;t+1sx;t+1
qx;tsx;t
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai =
%x;t+1nx;t+1
%x;tnx;t
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai =
%x;t+1
%x;t
zx2;t+1:
The normalized equation for bank’s wealth accumulation is
nx;t =
 
B[(R
B
x;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]
At 1
At
Vt 1
Vt
 ac
1 ai nx;t 1 +$qx;tsx;t

&x;t:
The borrow in advance constraint:
kx;t+1 = sx;t:
The leverage equation:
qx;tsx;t = %x;tnx;t:
Bank’s stochastic return on assets can be described in normalized variables as:
RBx;t+1 =
rKx;t+1ux;t+1 + qx;t+1(1  x)  a(ux;t+1)
qx;t
Kx;t+1
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
  1 ac
1 ai ;
knowing from the main model that
rKx;t =
RKx;t
Px;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t :
B.6 Monetary policy and market clearing
Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=
Rt 1
R
Rht

 t
t 1
 yt
yt 1
Y i1 R
mp;t;
Resource constraint in the consumption sector:
ct + (a(uC;t)kC;t 1 + a(uI;t)kI;t 1)
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai = L1 acC;t k
ac
C;t   FC :
Resource constraint in the investment sector:
it = L
1 ai
I;t k
ai
I;t   FI :
Definition of GDP:
yt = ct + pi;tit +

1  1
et

yt:
It further holds that
Lt = LI;t + LC;t; it =
h
i I;t + i
 
C;t
i  1

and Kt = KI;t +KC;t:
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C Steady State
The model economy is in parts identical to the one in Görtz and Tsoukalas (2011b). Therefore,
the main part of the derivations of the steady state relationships has already been shown in the
appendix to this paper. In this section we discuss the derivation of the remaining steady state
values, focussing mostly on the part of the economy concerned with financial intermediation.
Given the steady state values derived in Görtz and Tsoukalas (2011b) (with  =  1 indi-
cating the absence of intratemporal investment adjustment costs), one can derive the remaining
steady state relationships as follows.
The nominal interest rate is given from the Euler equation as
R =
1

e
ga+
ac
1 ai gvC :
The bank’s stationary stochastic discount factor can be expressed in the steady state as
B = 1:
The steady state borrow in advance constraint implies that
kx = sx:
The steady state price of capital is given by
qx;t = pi;t:
The steady state leverage equation is set equal to it’s average value in the data
qxsx
nx
= %x = 5:47:
The parameters $ and B help aligning the value of the leverage ratio and the interest rate
spread with their empirical counterparts. Using the calibrated value for B, the average value
for the leverage ratio (5:47) and the weighted quarterly average of the credit spreads (RBx  R =
0:005) allows calibrating $ using the bank’s wealth accumulation equation
$ =
h
1  B[(RBx  R)%x +R]e ga 
ac
1 ai gv
iqxsx
nx
 1
:
Owing to the non-linearity in the leverage ratio, we solve numerically for the steady state
expressions for  and  using
x = (1  B)Be ga 
ac
1 ai gv(RBx  R) + Bzx1x;
x = (1  B)Be ga 
ac
1 ai gvR + Bz
x
2x;
with
zx2 = (R
B
x  R)%x +R; and zx1 = zx2 ;
and the steady state leverage ratio
%x =
x
B   x :
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D Log-linearized Economy
The log-linear deviations of all variables are defined as
&^t  log &t   log &;
except for
z^t  zt   ga;
v^t  vt   gv;
^Cp;t  log(1 + Cp;t)  log(1 + Cp );
^Ip;t  log(1 + Ip;t)  log(1 + Ip);
^w;t  log(1 + w;t)  log(1 + w):
D.1 Firm’s production function and cost minimization
Production function for the intermediate good producing firm (i) in the consumption sector:
c^t =
c+ FI
c
[ack^C;t + (1  ac)L^C;t]:
Production function for the intermediate good producing firm (i) in the investment sector:
i^t =
i+ FI
i
[aik^I;t + (1  ai)L^I;t]:
Capital-to-labour ratios for the two sectors:
r^KC;t   w^t = L^C;t   k^C;t; r^KI;t   w^t = L^I;t   k^I;t: (D.1)
Marginal cost in both sectors:
m^cC;t = acr^
K
C;t + (1  ac)w^t; m^cI;t = air^KI;t + (1  ai)w^t   p^i;t: (D.2)
D.2 Firm’s prices
Price setting equation for firms that change their price in sector x = C; I:
0 = Et
( 1X
s=0
sp;x
s
h
~^px;t ~^t;t+s   ^xp;t+s   m^cx;t+s
i)
;
with
~^t;t+s =
sX
k=1
[px^t+k 1   ^t+k]:
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Solving for the summation
1
1  p;x ~^px;t =Et
( 1X
s=0
sp;x
s
  ^t;t+s + ^xp;t+s + m^cx;t+s
)
=  ^t;t + ^xp;t + m^cx;t  
p;x
1  p;x ^t;t+1
+ p;xEt
( 1X
s=1
s 1p;x 
s 1  ^t+1;t+s + ^xp;t+s + m^cx;t+s
)
=^xp;t + m^cx;t +
p;x
1  p;xEt

~^px;t+1   ^t;t+1

;
where we used ^t;t = 0.
Prices evolve as
0 = (1  p;x)~^px;t + p;x(px ^t 1   ^);
from which we obtain the Phillips curve in sector x = C; I:
^x;t =

1 + px
Et^x;t+1 +
px
1 + px
^x;t 1 + xm^cx;t + x^xp;t; (D.3)
with x =
(1  p;x)(1  p;x)
p;x(1 + px)
:
From equation (B.12) it follows that
^I;t   ^C;t = p^I;t   p^I;t 1:
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D.3 Households
D.3.1 Consumption
Marginal utility:
^t =
eG
eG   h
"
b^t +

z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t

 
 
eG
eG   h

c^t + z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t

  h
eG   hc^t 1
!#
  h
eG   hEt
"
b^t+1  
 
eG
eG   h

c^t+1 + z^t+1 +
ac
1  ai v^t+1

  h
eG   hc^t
!#
, ^t =1Etc^t+1   2c^t + 3c^t 1 + 4z^t + 5b^t + 6v^t; (D.4)
with
1 =
heG
(eG   h)(eG   h) ; 2 =
e2G + h2
(eG   h)(eG   h) ; 3 =
heG
(eG   h)(eG   h) ;
4 =
heGz   heG
(eG   h)(eG   h) ; 5 =
eG   hb
eG   h ; 6 =
(heGv   heG) ac1 ai
(eG   h)(eG   h) ;
eG = e
ga+
ac
1 ai gv :
This assumes the shock processes (1), (2) and (4).
Euler equation:
^t = R^t + Et

^t+1   z^t+1   v^t+1 ac
1  ai   ^C;t+1

: (D.5)
D.3.2 Investment and Capital
Capital utilisation in both sectors:
r^KC;t = u^C;t; r^
K
I;t = u^I;t; where 
 1 =
a0(1)
a00(1)
: (D.6)
Choice of investment for the consumption sector:
^t =  e2(
1
1 ai gv)

i^C;t   i^C;t 1 + 1
1  ai v^t

+ e
2( 1
1 ai gv)Et

i^C;t+1   i^C;t + 1
1  ai v^t+1

+ ^C;t   p^i;t   (1 + )
h
(i I + i
 
C )
 1(i C i^C;t + i
 
I i^I;t)  i^C;t
i
: (D.7)
Choice of investment for the investment sector:
^t =  e2(
1
1 ai gv)

i^I;t   i^I;t 1 + 1
1  ai v^t

+ e
2( 1
1 ai gv)Et

i^I;t+1   i^I;t + 1
1  ai v^t+1

+ ^I;t   p^i;t   (1 + )
h
(i I + i
 
C )
 1(i C i^C;t + i
 
I i^I;t)  i^I;t
i
: (D.8)
Capital input in both sectors:
k^C;t = u^C;t + 
K
C;t +
^kC;t 1   1
1  ai v^t; k^I;t = u^I;t + 
K
I;t +
^kI;t 1   1
1  ai v^t: (D.9)
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Capital accumulation in the consumption and investment sector:
^kC;t = (1  C)e 
1
1 ai gv

^kC;t 1 + KC;t  
1
1  ai v^t

+

1  (1  C)e 
1
1 ai gv

i^C;t; (D.10)
^kI;t = (1  I)e 
1
1 ai gv

^kI;t 1 + KI;t  
1
1  ai v^t

+

1  (1  I)e 
1
1 ai gv

i^I;t: (D.11)
D.3.3 Wages
The wage Phillips curve can be derived to be:25
w^t =
1
1 + 
w^t 1 +

1 + 
Etw^t+1   wg^w;t + w
1 + 
^c;t 1   1 + w
1 + 
^c;t
+

1 + 
Et^c;t+1 + w^w;t +
w
1 + 
 
z^t 1 +
ac
1  ai v^t 1

  1 + w   z
1 + 
z^t   1 + w   v
1 + 
ac
1  ai v^t: (D.12)
where
w  (1  w)(1  w)
w(1 + )
 
1 + 
 
1 + 1
w
 ;
g^w;t  w^t   (L^t + b^t   ^t):
D.4 Banking sector
The part of the economy concerned with the banking sector is described by the following equa-
tions:
The stochastic discount factor:
^Bt = ^t   ^t 1: (D.13)
Definition of :
^x;t =(1  Bzx1 )[^Bt+1   z^t+1  
ac
1  ai v^t+1]
+
1  Bzx1
RBx  R
[RBx R^
B
x;t+1  RR^t] + Bzx1 [z^x1;t+1 + ^x;t+1]; x = C; I: (D.14)
Definition of :
^x;t =(1  Bzx2 )[^Bt+1   z^t+1  
ac
1  ai v^t+1 +Rt]
+ Bz
x
2 [z^
x
2;t+1 + ^t+1]; x = C; I: (D.15)
Definition of z1:
z^x1;t = %^x;t   %^x;t 1 + z^x2;t; x = C; I: (D.16)
25The derivation is equivalent to the one described in the appendix to Görtz and Tsoukalas (2011b).
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Definition of z2:
z^x2;t =
1
(RBx  R)%x +R
[RBx %xR^
B
x;t +R(1  %x)R^t 1 + (RBx  R)%x%^x;t 1]; x = C; I:
(D.17)
The leverage ratio:
%^x;t = ^x;t +

B    ^x;t; x = C; I: (D.18)
The leverage equation:
q^x;t + s^x;t = %^x;t + n^x;t: (D.19)
The bank’s wealth accumulation equation
n^x;t =&xB%xe
 ga  ac1 ai gv
h
RBx R^
B
x;t +
 1
%x
  1

RR^t 1 + (RBx  R)%^x;t 1
i
+ &xBe
 ga  ac1 ai gv [(RBx  R)%x +R]
h
  z^t   ac
1  ai v^t + n^x;t 1
i
+ (1  &xBe ga 
ac
1 ai gv [(RBx  R)%x +R])[q^t + s^t]
+ [Be
 ga  ac1 ai gv((RBx  R)%x +R) + (1  B((RBx  R)%x +R))]&^x;t; x = C; I:
(D.20)
The borrow in advance constraint:
^kx;t+1 = s^x;t; x = C; I: (D.21)
The bank’s stochastic return on assets in sector x = C; I:
R^Bx;t =
1
rKx + qx(1  x)
[rKx (r^
K
x;t + u^x;t) + qx(1  x)q^x;t]  q^x;t 1 + Kx;t + z^t  
1  ac
1  ai v^t:
(D.22)
External finance premium:
R^x;t = R^
B
x;t+1   R^t; x = C; I: (D.23)
D.5 Monetary policy and market clearing
Monetary policy rule:
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)
h
^t + (^t   ^t 1) + Y (y^t   y^t 1)
i
+ ^mp;t (D.24)
Resource constraint in the consumption sector:
c^t +

rKC
kC
c
u^C;t + r
K
I
kI
c
u^I;t

e
  1
1 ai gv =
c+ Fc
c
[ack^C;t + (1  ac)L^C;t] (D.25)
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Resource constraint in the investment sector:
i^t =
i+ FI
i
[aik^I;t + (1  ai)L^I;t] (D.26)
Definition of GDP:
y^t =
c
c+ pii
c^t +
pii
c+ pii
(^it + p^i;t) + e^t: (D.27)
It further holds that
LC
L
L^C;t +
LI
L
L^I;t = L^t;

i C + i
 
I
 1 
i I i^I;t + i
 
C i^C;t

= i^t and
kC
k
k^C;t +
kI
k
k^I;t = k^t:
(D.28)
D.6 Exogenous processes
The exogenous processes of the 10 shocks can be written in log-linearized form as follows:
Price markup shock in sector x = C; I:
^xp;t = xp ^
x
p;t 1 + "
x
p;t   xp"xp;t 1: (D.29)
The TFP growth shock to the consumption sector:
z^t = z z^t 1 + "zt : (D.30)
The TFP growth shock to the investment sector:
v^t = vv^t 1 + "vt : (D.31)
Wage markup shock:
^w;t = w^w;t 1 + "w;t   w"w;t 1: (D.32)
Preference shock:
b^t = bb^t 1 + "bt : (D.33)
Monetary policy shock:
^mp;t = "
mp
t : (D.34)
GDP measurement error:
e^t = ee^t 1 + "et : (D.35)
Shock to the bank’s equity capital in sector x = C; I:
&^x;t = &x &^x;t 1 + 
&
x;t: (D.36)
Shock to the quality of available capital in sector x = C; I:
^Kx;t = K ;x^
K
x;t + "
K
x;t with "
K
x;t = "
K;0
x;t + "
K;news
x;t (D.37)
The whole log-linear economy model of the economy is summarized by equations (D.1) -
(D.28) and the shock processes (D.29) - (D.37).
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E Measurement equations
For the estimation the model variables are linked with the observables using measurement
equations. Letting a superscript "d" denote the observables, then the model’s measurement
equations are,
Cdt  log
 Ct
Ct 1

= log
 ct
ct 1

+ z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t;
Idt  log
 It
It 1

= log
 it
it 1

+
1
1  ai v^t;PI;t
PC;t
d
 log
PI;t
PC;t
=
PI;t 1
PC;t 1

= log
 pi;t
pi;t 1

+ z^t +
ac   1
1  ai v^t;
W dt  log
 Wt
Wt 1

= log
 wt
wt 1

+ z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t;
Y dt  log
 Yt
Yt 1

= log
 yt
yt 1

+ z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t;
dC;t  C;t = ^C;t and ^C;t = log(C;t)  log(C);
dI;t  I;t = ^I;t and ^I;t = log(I;t)  log(I);
Ldt  logLt = L^t;
Rdt  logRt = log R^t;
R;dC;t  logRC;t = log R^BC;t+1   log R^t;
R;dI;t  logRI;t = log R^BI;t+1   log R^t:
Ndt  log
 Nt
Nt 1

= e
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
 nC
nC + nI
(n^C;t   n^C;t 1) + nI
nC + nI
(n^I;t   n^I;t 1) + z^t + ac
1  ai v^t

F Data Appendix
Table 8 provides an overview of the data used to construct the observables. All the data trans-
formations we have made in order to construct the dataset used for the estimation of the model
are described in the following.
Real and nominal variables. Consumption (in current prices) is defined as the sum of per-
sonal consumption expenditures on services and personal consumption expenditures on non-
durable goods. The times series for real consumption is constructed as follows. First, we
compute the shares of services and non-durable goods in total (current price) consumption.
Then, total real consumption growth is obtained as the chained weighted (using the nominal
shares above) growth rate of real services and growth rate of real non-durable goods. Using
this growth rate of real consumption and knowing that nominal consumption equals its real
counterpart in the base year (2005), we can construct a series for real consumption. The con-
sumption deflator is calculated as the ratio of nominal over real consumption. Inflation of
consumer prices is the growth rate of the consumption deflator. Analogously, we construct a
time series for the investment deflator using series for (current price) personal consumption ex-
penditures on durable goods and gross private domestic investment and chain weight to arrive
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at the real aggregate. The relative price of investment is the ratio of the investment deflator
and the consumption deflator. Real output is GDP expressed in consumption units by dividing
current price GDP with the consumption deflator.
The hourly wage is defined as total compensation per hour. Dividing this series by the
consumption deflator yields the real wage rate. Hours worked is given by hours of all persons
in the non-farm business sector. The nominal interest rate is the effective federal funds rate.
We use the monthly average per quarter of this series and divide it by four to account for the
quarterly frequency of the model.
Following Del Negro et al. (2007) the series of investment, consumption, output and hours
worked are expressed in per capita terms by dividing with civilian non-institutional population,
aged 16 and over. The time series for hours is in logs. Moreover, all series in estimation
(including the financial time series described below) are expressed in deviations from their
sample average.
Financial variables. Data for credit spreads defined separately for the two sectors in the
model are not directly available. However, Reuters’ Datastream provides US credit spreads
for companies which we map into the two sectors using The North American Industry Clas-
sification System (NAICS).26 A credit spread is defined as the difference between a com-
pany’s corporate bond yield and the yield of a US Treasury bond with an identical matu-
rity. In constructing credit spreads we only consider non-financial corporations. In line with
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011) we make the following adjustments to the credit spread data we
construct: using ratings from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, we exclude all bonds which
are below investment grade as well as the bonds for which ratings are unavailable. We further
exclude all spreads with a maturity below one and above 30 years and exclude all credit spreads
below 10 and above 5000 basis points to ensure that the time series are not driven by a small
number of extreme observations. The series for the sectoral credit spreads are constructed by
taking the mean over all spreads available in a certain quarter. These two series are transformed
from basis points into percent and divided by four to guarantee that they are consistent with the
quarterly frequency of our model. After these adjustments the dataset (1990Q2-2011Q1) con-
tains 5376 spreads of bonds of which 1213 are classified to be issued by companies in the
consumption sector and 4163 issued by companies in the investment sector. This is equivalent
to 36425 observations in the consumption and 116628 observations in the investment sector
over the entire sample. The average maturity is 30 quarters (consumption sector) and 28 quar-
ters (investment sector) with an average rating for both sectoral bond issues between BBB+
and A-. The total number of firms in our sample is equal to 1696, with 516 firms belonging
to the consumption sector and 1180 firms belonging to the investment sector. The correlation
between the two sectoral spread series is equal to 0.83.
Sectoral Hours. Disaggregated data on hours worked that is fully consistent with the con-
cept of our series for aggregate hours (hours of All Persons, non-farm business sector) are not
available. To construct series for sectoral hours worked we use the product of all employees
and average weekly hours of production and non-supervisory workers at the 2-digit level. This
26We use the 2005 NAICS codes. The investment sector is defined to consist of companies in mining, utilities,
transportation and warehousing, information, manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade industries (NAICS
codes 21 22 23 31 32 33 42 48 49 51 (except 491)). The consumption sector consists of companies in retail trade,
finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing, professional and business services, educational services, health
care and social assistance,arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services and other services
except government (NAICS codes 6 7 11 44 45 52 53 54 55 56 81).
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data is aggregated for the consumption and investment sector by using 2005 NAICS codes.
The 2-digit industries are allocated to the consumption and investment sector according to the
sectoral definitions derived from the 2005 Input-Output tables outlined in Section 3, and is
consistent with the allocation used for the sectoral bond spreads.
Steady state financial parameters. The steady state leverage ratio of financial interme-
diaries in the model, used to pin down the parameters $ and B, is calculated by taking the
sample average of the inverse of total equity over “adjusted” assets of all insured US commer-
cial banks available from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. The same
body reports a series of equity over total assets. We multiply this ratio with total assets in order
to get total equity for the US banking sector that we use in estimation. Total assets includes
consumer loans and holdings of government bonds which we want to exclude from total as-
sets to be consistent with the model concept. Thus, to arrive at an estimate for adjusted assets
we subtract consumer, real estate loans and holdings of government and government guaran-
teed bonds (such as government sponsored institutions) from total assets of all insured U.S.
commercial banks.
Table 8: Time Series used to construct the observables and steady state relationships
Time Series Description Units Code Source
Gross domestic product CP, SA, billion $ GDP BEA
Gross Private Domestic Investment CP, SA, billion $ GPDI BEA
Real Gross Private Domestic Investment CVM, SA, billion $ GPDIC1 BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods CP, SA, billion $ PCDG BEA
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods CVM, SA, billion $ PCDGCC96 BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services CP, SA, billion $ PCESV BEA
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services CVM, SA, billion $ PCESVC96 BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods CP, SA, billion $ PCND BEA
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods CVM, SA, billion $ PCNDGC96 BEA
Civilian Noninstitutional Population NSA, 1000s CNP160V BLS
Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour SA, Index 2005=100 COMPNFB BLS
Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons SA, Index 2005=100 HOANBS BLS
Effective Federal Funds Rate NSA, percent FEDFUNDS BG
Total Equity NSA EQTA IEC
Total Assets NSA H.8 FRB
All Employees SA B-1 BLS
Average Weekly Hours SA B-7 BLS
CP = current prices, CVM = chained volume measures (2005 Dollars), SA = seasonally adjusted, NSA = not seasonally adjusted. BEA
= U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BLS = U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics and BG
= Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, IEC = Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, FRB = Federal Reserve
Board.
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Appendix D: Additional Tables
Table 9: Cross-Correlations of total and sectoral (model and data) hours with real GDP
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6
Data
Total Hours -0.174 -0.049 0.129 0.304 0.486 0.685 0.861 0.878 0.816 0.680 0.495 0.308 0.121
Consumption sector hours -0.275 -0.154 0.004 0.168 0.358 0.579 0.801 0.859 0.840 0.749 0.578 0.412 0.236
Investment sector hours -0.210 -0.099 0.062 0.225 0.409 0.616 0.819 0.865 0.821 0.708 0.551 0.389 0.219
Model (all shocks activated)
Total Hours -0.174 -0.049 0.129 0.304 0.486 0.685 0.861 0.878 0.816 0.680 0.495 0.308 0.121
Consumption sector hours -0.072 0.075 0.257 0.419 0.582 0.748 0.901 0.857 0.747 0.603 0.423 0.225 0.046
Investment sector hours -0.241 -0.150 0.002 0.166 0.342 0.544 0.717 0.784 0.772 0.660 0.495 0.340 0.170
Data and model time series areHP1600 detrended.
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Table 11: Correlation of GDP with macroeconomic aggregates and credit spreads
Consumption Investment Hours Consumption Sector Credit Spread Investment Sector Credit Spread
GDP 0.870 0.927 0.861 -0.484 -0.555
All time series except the spreads are per capita andHP1600 filtered.
Appendix E: Additional Figures
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
−0.2
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0.1
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Figure 11: Valuation news (8 quarter ahead) shock (thin line) and Fitch one-year ahead probability
of default measure (thick line). A positive value for the valuation shock series indicates unfavorable
news.
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Figure 12: Responses to a negative one standard deviation unanticipated TFP shock in the con-
sumption sector.
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Figure 13: Responses to a negative one standard deviation unanticipated TFP shock in the invest-
ment sector.
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